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ABSTRACT
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIC ROLES: STRATEGIC ROLE
CONFLICT AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
FEBRUARY 2016
HECTOR R. FLORES, B.S., MONTERREY INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
M.B.A., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor William Wooldridge

The middle-management perspective has produced a great understanding of the
connection of middle managers involvement in strategy and organizational outcomes
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1996; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Wooldridge & Floyd,
1990). Strategic role conflict has been identified in the literature as a hindrance, even an
impediment, to effective middle-management involvement in strategy (Floyd & Lane,
2000). Despite a growing body of theoretical work by scholars on the strategy process,
there has been limited empirical research of the antecedents of strategic role conflict.
Drawing from the literatures of role conflict, middle management perspective, and
social exchange theory, this dissertation hypothesized that demographic characteristics of
middle managers, the nature of their position within the organization, the quality of their
relationships with top management, and the degree of dissimilarity of their environmental
perceptions vis-à-vis top management are associated with middle managers’ strategic role
conflict.
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A large, global manufacturing company based in the United States participated in
the study. Survey data was collected from 249 middle managers at four organizational
levels within two divisions. Two structural models were tested. Data showed that the
more parsimonious model was not supported while the less parsimonious model was
supported. Results indicated that key predictors of middle managers’ strategic role
conflict were the amount of boundary spanning that middle managers engage in as part of
their jobs, the degree of disparity in their perception of the products and factors markets
vis-à-vis top management, the frequency of their direct communication with their top
manager, the amount of mutual trust between the top manager and the middle manager,
and the amount of disparity in the feelings of mutual affect between the top manager and
the middle manager.
This study contributes to the strategy literature by demonstrating the applicability
of role conflict theory to the strategy process in explicating links between strategic role
conflict and its antecedents. A better understanding of strategic role conflict is important
to the strategy process literature because of its theorized interference with middle
manager’s effective strategic performance and its possible negative consequences for the
organization. An alternative model of strategic role conflict is presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Research Question
It has been established that middle managers’ involvement in strategy has an
effect on important organizational outcomes (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). The middle
management perspective (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1996; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000)
identifies four strategic roles of middle managers: championing alternatives, facilitating
adaptability, synthesizing information, and implementing deliberate strategy. In the
current business environment, characterized by intensified competition, rapid change,
continuous innovation, shorter product life cycles, and blurring industry boundaries,
middle managers face increasingly conflicting behavioral expectations between the need
to exploit existing competencies (through implementing deliberate strategy and
synthesizing information) and the need to develop new competencies (through facilitating
adaptability and championing alternatives) resulting in what has been described as
strategic role conflict (Floyd & Lane, 2000). The phenomenon of strategic role conflict
has been identified as important because of its harmful effects on important
organizational outcomes (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Consequently, the antecedents of
strategic role conflict, i.e., the factors that make its occurrence more or less likely and its
intensity more or less severe are also important to understand. Therefore, this
dissertation addresses the following research question:
 What are the antecedents of strategic role conflict?
This research question is important because middle managers’ involvement in strategy
has been shown to have an effect on important organizational outcomes (Wooldridge &
Floyd, 1990).
1

1.2 The Middle Management Perspective
Two opposing views of strategic organizational change exist in the literature. The
“top-down” or decision-making view of strategy (e.g., Chandler, 1962), argues that
competitive advantage is achieved as the firm identifies an attractive industry, acquires
and deploys the necessary resources, and carves out a defensible position called its
product-market strategy (Porter, 1980, 1985). Key to this paradigm is that the
organization is a reflection of its top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) who are able
to recognize and rationally evaluate all possible alternatives, choose the best course of
action, acquire the necessary resources, and deploy them for a competitive advantage. In
this view, middle managers’ and lower organizational members’ only role in strategy is
its implementation.
An alternative view argues that competitive advantage derives from “bottom-up”
social learning (Quinn 1980; Burgelman, 1983a,b,c; Burgelman, 1984; Floyd &
Wooldridge, 2000). Strategy development is an evolutionary process that cycles through
a belief that change is necessary, actions to create change, understanding what works, and
learning how to do what works (Doz, 1996). Its focus is on developing new
competencies. The purpose of these actions is to re-align the organization’s strategy with
changes in the external environment (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Huff, Huff, & Thomas, 1992).
In this view, middle managers’ actions that shield autonomous behaviors of operating
managers from the selective forces of the existing structural context are important to
organizational outcomes (Burgelman, 1991, 1994).
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1.3 Strategic Role Conflict
Role conflict is the simultaneous occurrence of two or more role expectations for
the behavior of a person such that compliance with one would make compliance with the
other(s) more difficult or even impossible causing problems for the person (Biddle, 1979,
1986; Pandey & Kumar, 1997). Dissensus occurs when two or more role expectations for
the behavior of a person are in conflict. Polarized dissensus occurs when there exist two
clear sets of opposing expectations (Biddle, 1979). Dissensus is likely to result in role
conflict.
The type of conflict that concerns this dissertation is inter-sender role conflict.
Inter-sender role conflict emerges when the expectations of two different role senders for
the behaviors associated with the same position incumbent are incompatible (Rizzo,
House, & Lirtzman, 1970). Inter-sender role conflict is likely to occur if managers are
expected to follow instructions from two or more superiors who have differing agendas.
A special type of inter-sender role conflict involves a manager and his or her supervisor.
Specifically, if the expectations of a superior for a manager’s behavior are in conflict
with the expectations that the manager has for his or her own behavior, inter-sender role
conflict is likely to occur. For instance, if a middle manager’s supervisor believes that
the middle manager should spend most of her time implementing given strategy whereas
the middle manager believes that she should spend most of her time championing novel
strategic initiatives, inter-sender (strategic) role dissensus occurs and can give rise to
(strategic) role conflict. Strategic role conflict is a special type of role conflict that arises
when the conflicting roles are strategic in nature (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Since the roles in
the preceding example have been identified as strategic middle managers’ roles (Floyd &
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Wooldridge, 1992), the type of role conflict that arises in this situation is called strategic
role conflict.
It is important to study role conflict because it has particularly negative effects on
a manager’s role performance (Friedman & Podolny, 1992). The dysfunctional effect of
role conflict on the individual manager stems from the stress generated by the difficulty
of satisfying different parties, the lack of full trust that it fosters, and the lack of clarity of
which role is appropriate to enact (Van Sell, Brief, and Schuler, 1981). Role conflict has
been linked to role stress in the workplace (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970) and to
withdrawal or avoidance of those who are perceived as creating the conflict (Kahn,
Wolfe, Quinn, & Snoek, 1964). In addition, the effectiveness of the manager’s role
performance suffers because of strained relations that it creates (Adams, 1976). As a
special kind of role conflict, strategic role conflict also has negative consequences, but
because of its strategic nature, it ultimately can impact important organizational outcomes
(Floyd & Lane, 2000).
Based on the middle management perspective (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000) and
combining insights from role theory (Biddle 1979, 1986), this dissertation explores the
antecedents of strategic role conflict in a large, complex organization. The present study
has significant implications for the strategic management literature. This study tests the
assumptions that certain demographic characteristics of middle managers, the nature of
their position within the organization, the quality of their relationships with top
management, and the degree of dissimilarity of their environmental perceptions vis-à-vis
top management’s affect middle managers strategic role conflict. Understanding the
reasons behind middle managers’ strategic role conflict is an important research interest

4

in the field of strategy because it has been theorized that strategic role conflict
undermines middle managers’ strategic effectiveness and because it has been shown that
middle managers involvement in strategy has an impact on important organizational
outcomes (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). This study has an important implication for
theory because it extends role theory into the middle management literature by testing
empirically the relationship between strategic role conflict and its antecedents.

5

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In this chapter, I lay the conceptual foundations that support the proposed
relationships between strategic role conflict and its antecedents. I do this in several
related sections. First, there is a summary of role theory since it is the underlying theory
for the research being proposed. In this section, I discuss strategic role conflict. One
topic discussed, among others, is how the degree of dissimilarity of a middle manager’s
environmental perceptions vis-à-vis his or her top manager’s affects the middle
manager’s experience of strategic role conflict. Next, a discussion of the Middle
Management Perspective follows. Within this section, I discuss the importance of middle
managers’ involvement in strategy, the strategic roles that middle managers play, the
importance of the nature of their position within the organization, and the relevance of
some demographic characteristics of middle managers. Finally, I close the chapter with a
discussion of relational exchanges. Within this section, I discuss the importance of the
quality of a middle manager’s relationship with his or her top manager.

2.1 Role Conflict
To understand strategic role conflict, one must begin with an understanding of
role theory and role concepts. The origins of role theory can be traced back to Weber’s
writings on bureaucracy and even before that (e.g., Durkheim, 1893; James, 1890;
Sumner, 1906), but the use of the word “role” came later. Mead (1934) was the first to
use the concept of “role taking” along with other terminology to describe the process of
socialization. Role taking refers to an actor holding veridical expectations that correctly
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map those of the individual holding expectations for the behavior of the actor (Biddle,
1979). Moreno (1934) used the terms “role” and “role playing” to study strategies for
learning. Role-playing differs from role taking because role-playing involves behavior
whereas role taking involves the accuracy of cognition. According to Moreno, roleplaying occurs when a person tries to imitate the roles of others (Biddle, 1986) while role
taking is “an attitude already frozen in the behavior of the person” (Biddle & Thomas,
1966, p. 7). Linton (1936) recognized the concepts of status (i.e., “a position”) and role
(i.e., “a set of behaviors”) as separate and distinct. A position is a collection of rights and
duties whereas a role is the dynamic enactment of said rights and duties, and as such, is
characterized by behavior (Linton, 1936). Functional role theory studied the
characteristic behaviors of actors in social positions within a stable social system and
attempted to explain why a system is stable and how it induces conformity in its
participants (Parsons, 1951; Parsons & Shils, 1951). Roles are conceived as shared,
normative expectations that on the one hand prescribe behavior and on the other explain
it. It is assumed that norms have been learned and that actors in the social system
conform to them when they behave. It is further assumed that actors sanction other actors
for conformity to “shared” norms (Bates & Harvey, 1975). Merton (1957) introduced the
concepts of role-set (i.e., different sets of behaviors available to an actor), role
relationships, and role-expectations. These important concepts led to the development of
the concept of competing expectations between role-sets and the concept of role conflict.
Katz and Kahn (1966, 1978) saw role behavior as a combination of the actor’s own
perception of the role and his or her actions in response to the messages received from
role senders. The literature defines three different modes of role expectations:
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conceptions (i.e., covert expectations), enunciations (i.e., expressed expectations) and
inscriptions (i.e., written expectations) and posits that conceptions can appear as norms,
preferences, and beliefs (Biddle, 1979, 1986).
According to role theory, a role is a set of behaviors characteristic of individuals
in a particular context that can be expected by others, by the individual, or both (Biddle,
1979; Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Nandram & Klandermans, 1993).
When actors in a social system know and share the same or similar expectations for the
behaviors associated with a social position, it is said that they are in consensus. Contrary
to consensus is dissensus. Dissensus occurs when expectations are dissimilar (Biddle,
1979, 1986). Conflicting expectations (i.e., dissensus) can lead to role conflict. Role
conflict has been defined in different ways, two of which are adopted in this dissertation.
(1) Role conflict is the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations
for the behavior of a person that cause problems for the person (Biddle, 1979, 1986).
And (2) role conflict is “a state of mind or experience or perception of the role incumbent
arising out of the simultaneous occurrence of two or more role expectations such that
compliance with one would make compliance with the other(s) more difficult or even
impossible” (Pandey & Kumar, 1997, p. 191).
Intra-role conflict is experienced if the different expectations associated with a
single role conflict with one another. There are two different types of intra-role conflict:
(a) intra-sender conflict and (b) inter-sender conflict. Intra-sender conflict occurs when a
single role sender has incompatible expectations towards the role incumbent. In other
words, when a single individual makes contradictory demands for the behavior of himself
or herself or of another person, intra-sender conflict is said to occur (Biddle, 1979; Katz
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& Kahn, 1978). For example, if a supervisor expects a subordinate to carry out a specific
task but at the same time forbids the use of the only tools that allow the subordinate to
accomplish the task, intra-sender conflict ensues. Inter-sender conflict emerges when the
expectations of two different role senders for the behaviors associated with the same
position directed to the same position incumbent are incompatible. In other words, if the
expectations of different groups or different persons (e.g., employees and customers;
multiple supervisors; the employee and his or her supervisor) for the behavior of the focal
(or object) individual are incompatible, inter-sender role conflict occurs (Rizzo, House, &
Lirtzman, 1970). For example, inter-sender conflicts are likely to occur if the principle of
unity of command is violated and managers are expected to follow instructions from, and
report to, two or more superiors who have differing agendas. Thus, an individual can
experience role conflict if he or she receives inconsistent direction from a single manager
or if he or she receives inconsistent direction from multiple managers simultaneously
(Rizzo et al., 1970). The directions can be in the form of conceptions (covert
expectations), enunciations (expressed expectations), or inscriptions (i.e., written
expectations) (Biddle, 1979). A last type of role conflict is inter-role conflict, which is
likely to occur if the expectations associated with the different roles that an individual is
expected to play are incompatible with one another. For instance, the expectations
associated with the individual’s role as a manager (e.g., to work overtime) may conflict
with the expectations associated with the individual’s role as a father or mother (e.g., to
come home from work early). Finally, individuals may experience personal role conflict
if the expectations associated with one of the individual’s roles are in conflict with the
person’s own needs, aspirations, or values. For example, a manager’s superiors may
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expect that he or she bribe local government officials in order to be awarded a contract
but such behavior may be in conflict with his or her values (Mohr & Puck, 2007). Kahn,
Wolfe, Quinn, and Snoek (1964) proposed a theoretical model of factors involved in role
conflict and ambiguity that identifies antecedents of role expectations and role conflict.
Of particular relevance for this dissertation is the effect of personality factors,
interpersonal relations, and organizational factors as antecedents of role conflict.

2.1.1 Strategic Role Conflict
Strategic role conflict is a special type of role conflict in which the conflicting
roles are of strategic importance for the organization. Floyd and Lane (2000) proposed
that the process of strategic renewal is composed of three distinct sub processes (i.e.,
competence definition, competence modification, and competence deployment). Each of
these sub processes calls for a different set of strategic roles. The authors argue that each
of these set of roles differ in the behaviors that they call for, their time horizons, the core
values that they embed, the information required, and their emotional tone. Strategic role
conflict develops when there is ambiguity as to which strategic renewal sub process the
organization should use. In simple, stable situations, it is likely that managers at all
levels will develop consistent interpretation of environmental cues and reach similar
conclusions as to what strategic renewal sub process is required; and as a result, what
strategic roles each level of management should enact. Conversely, in highly turbulent
and complex conditions managers are likely to focus on different sub sections of the
environment, and/or interpret environmental cues differently, and/or differ in their
assessment of the relative importance of these environmental cues (Floyd & Lane, 2000;
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Weick, 1995). These different perceptions and interpretations of environmental cues lead
to different conclusions as to which strategic renewal sub process is adequate; and
consequently, what strategic roles are expected. When different managers have
dissimilar expectations for the strategic behavior of a third manager, inter-sender strategic
role conflict (i.e., “strategic role conflict” for short) occurs. The focus of this dissertation
is a special case of these inter-sender strategic role conflicts. The case under study is
when a middle manager has dissimilar expectations for his or her own strategic behavior
vis-à-vis the expectations held by his top manager.
2.1.2 Importance of Studying Strategic Role Conflict
Role conflict has particularly negative effects on a middle manager’s role
performance (Friedman & Podolny, 1992). Under turbulent and complex environmental
conditions, managers at all levels become aware of conditions that require organizational
action. As stated earlier, managers at different levels are likely to perceive and interpret
environmental cues differently. As a result, it also likely that top managers, for instance,
will have dissimilar expectations for middle managers’ strategic behavior than middle
managers may have for their own strategic behavior. These conflicting expectations are
likely to result in strategic role conflict (Katz & Kahn, 1966). The dysfunctional effect of
strategic role conflict on the individual manager stems from the stress generated by the
difficulty of satisfying different parties, the lack of full trust shown by the party or parties
with whom the middle manager disagrees, and the lack of clarity of which strategic role
is appropriate to enact (Van Sell, Brief, and Schuler, 1981). Role conflict has been linked
to role stress in the workplace (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970) and to withdrawal or
avoidance of those who are perceived as creating the conflict (Kahn, et al., 1964). Being
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a special kind of role conflict, strategic role conflict is likely to lead to similar negative
effects. In the special case of strategic role conflict, the effectiveness of the middle
manager’s strategic role performance is likely to suffer because of strained relations with
top managers worrying that the middle manager is concentrating on the wrong things
(Adams, 1976). Ultimately, organizational processes such as strategic renewal are
presumably less effective as a result of the reduced level and poor quality of personal
relationships that strategic role conflict produces (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Kahn, et al.,
1964).
2.1.3 Dissimilarity in Environmental Perceptions between the Middle Manager and
his or her Top Manager.
The literature documents many reasons why managers at different levels in the
organization have different perceptions of the environment. For instance, environmental
dynamism is theorized to play a key role in the emergence and severity of strategic role
conflict by eliciting different perceptions and interpretations of the need for and the type
of change and by leading to different conclusions at different managerial levels of what
strategic renewal sub process should be used; and therefore, what strategic roles are
appropriate to enact (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Under highly complex, highly dynamic
conditions, managers may be uncertain whether change is necessary and unclear of what
kind of change is appropriate. And as a result, the likelihood of confusion of what
strategic role is expected of them is increased (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Huff et al., 1992).
Functional orientation and technical expertise have been mentioned as reasons
why managers at different levels perceive the environment differently because they create
differences in managers’ mental frameworks that translate in different perceptions. For
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instance, individuals at lower-levels of management usually tend to acquire knowledge of
new technologies earlier than managers at higher levels. Conversely, top managers tend
to have more expertise in established technologies. These differences in technical
expertise are likely to influence the way each level of management interprets the
environment (Burgelman, 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Weick, 1995). Environmental
orientation and boundary-spanning activity have also been mentioned as reasons why
managers at different levels perceive the environment differently (Floyd & Lane, 2000).
For instance, when engaging in boundary-spanning activities, operating-level managers
tend to focus on technical concerns (i.e., “factor markets”) or customer concerns (i.e.,
“product markets”, Floyd & Lane, 2000; Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Thompson, 1967).
As a result of their closer contact with customers and suppliers, operating-level managers
may be more likely to see a need for strategic change and the need for developing new
competencies sooner than top managers, whereas top managers, who take their cue from
capital markets, are more likely to perceive the need to preserve the status quo (Floyd &
Lane, 2000; Burgelman, 1994). Conversely, top managers’ boundary-spanning activity
tends to focus on shareholders, bondholders, or other financing concerns, (i.e., “capital
markets”, Floyd & Lane, 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Being between these two
levels, middle managers are expected to act like “linking pins” (Likert, 1961), and their
focus could be on any one or a combination of these sub-environments on which the
other levels are focused. If the middle manager’s focus is in alignment with his or her top
manager’s, it is likely that their perceptions of the environment would tend to coincide,
their expectations regarding strategic roles would tend to coincide as well, and strategic
role conflict would not arise. However, if the middle manager’s focus is not in alignment
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with his or her top manager’s, their perceptions of the environment would tend to be in
conflict, their expectations regarding strategic roles would tend to conflict as well, and
strategic role conflict is likely to arise.

2.2 The Middle Management Perspective
The middle management perspective emerged as an alternative view of strategy to
the prevailing top management perspective of the 1980’s. Hambrick and Mason’s (1984)
top management perspective conceptualizes strategy as a top-down decision-making
process and rests on the assumption of a highly analytical and comprehensive process at
the top, hyper-rational top managers, and a fully committed organization at the bottom
(Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1962; Child, 1972; Hambrick & Mason, 1984;
Porter, 1980). The top management approach creates an artificial dichotomy between
strategy formulation and strategy implementation whereby upper management makes
strategic decisions and directs the resource allocation process (Andrews, 1971;
Fredrickson, 1983; Hambrick, 1988; Mintzberg, 1978), while middle and operating
managers implement the strategies set forth by upper management (i.e., “top-down”;
Chandler, 1962). The focus of this view is more on the outcome of decisions (i.e.,
content) than on the decision-making process itself.
In contrast, the middle management perspective sees strategy making as a
learning process. Middle managers are regarded as key actors in the development and
accumulation of new capabilities for long-term, sustainable competitive advantage (Floyd
& Wooldridge, 2000). The middle level perspective argues that middle managers’
involvement in strategy has important consequences for organizational outcomes whether
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it is bottom-up strategy making (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993; Nonaka, 1994) or strategy
implementation (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997). As a result, strategic leadership can also
occur at any level of the organization (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997, 2000). Strategy
making is seen as an incremental model that studies how personnel at different levels of
the organization contribute to the formation of strategy thorough a socio-political
learning process (i.e., “bottom-up”; Burgelman, 1983a,b,c; Burgelman, 1994; Lindblom,
1959; Mintzberg, 1978; Quinn, 1980). “Social learning” implies that managers and
others in the organization jointly learn how to adapt to a changing environment.
Researchers have long argued that the dichotomy of strategy into formulation and
implementation, and its concomitant division of managers into thinkers and doers, is not
an accurate representation of reality (Mintzberg, 1978). The flaw in this dichotomy is
that it ignores the learning that follows the conception of an intended strategy and often
influences and changes said strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). Accordingly, our interest should
be on realized strategy as a discernible pattern in a stream of decisions that exhibits a
consistency over time regardless of whether this consistency was intended or just
“emerged”. Realized strategies frequently evolve from the interplay of top
management’s intended strategies and the efforts of middle and lower managers
throughout the organization to influence the strategic direction of the firm (Mintzberg,
1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
2.2.1 Importance of the Middle Manager’s Involvement in Strategy
The involvement of middle management in the development of strategy has been
shown to be not trivial. Indeed, it has been directly tied to measures of organizational
performance (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Improved decision-making and higher
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strategic consensus have been identified as the key mechanism of a positive association
between middle management involvement in strategy and organizational performance.
Thus, middle managers play a more strategic role in capability development, quality of
strategic decision-making, and strategy implementation. During turbulent conditions,
companies that rely on middle level managers to continuously communicate alternative
strategies to upper management are the best performing ones because they are able to
execute the strategic renewal process more effectively (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990; Floyd
& Lane, 2000). It is in the context of strategic renewal that strategic role conflict takes
place (Floyd & Lane, 2000).
2.2.2 Middle Managers’ Strategic Roles
Having discussed how middle managers’ involvement in strategy has an
important impact on organizational outcomes, I now turn my attention to the different
forms of middle managers’ strategic involvement. Floyd & Wooldridge (1992) identified
four strategic roles of middle managers: championing alternatives, synthesizing
information, facilitating adaptability, and implementing deliberate strategy. These four
roles can be better understood by differentiating them along behavioral and cognitive
dimensions (see Figure 2.1 below). On the behavioral dimension, middle managers’
strategic roles can be differentiated according to the object of their action. Upward
influence targets top managers. Downward influence targets operational managers and
operational personnel. On the cognitive dimension, middle managers’ integrative
strategic roles are in alignment with existing strategy, whereas divergent roles attempt to
alter the organization’s concept of strategy.
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Figure 2.1
Middle managers’ strategic roles
Type of
Activity
Cognitive

Divergent
Integrative

Behavioral
Upward
Influence
Championing
Alternatives
Synthesizing
Information

Downward
Influence
Facilitating
Adaptability
Implementing
Deliberate
Strategy

Further examination of the types of middle managers’ strategic activity comes
from the literature on middle managers’ upward influence. Dutton and Ashford (1993)
developed a framework to describe and study the upward influence efforts of middle
managers, which the authors call “issue selling”. The issue-selling role that Dutton and
Ashford (1993) identified involves some of the behaviors found in the championing and
information-synthesis roles identified by Floyd and Wooldridge (1992a). Through issue
selling, middle managers influence what issues come to the attention of top management
and thus help determine the strategic context, which in turn has an impact on important
organizational outcomes (Dutton, Ashford, Wierba, O’Neill, & Hayes, 1997).
Literature focusing on the downward influence of middle managers shows how a
middle manager’s leadership style influences strategic change, another important
organizational outcome. Middle managers tend to be more effective introducing
technological change using a transformational leadership approach rather than a
transactional one. Focusing on technical problems to the neglect of people and
organizational issues tends to be counterproductive (Beatty & Lee, 1992). Similarly,
management of employees’ emotions is critical during periods of radical change. For
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instance, middle managers that helped people make sense of, and cope with, change
prevented potentially disorderly reactions and facilitated a smoother implementation of a
downsizing strategy that otherwise would have been very disruptive (Huy, 2001; 2002).
Thus, middle managers are essential to strategic implementation as well as to strategy
development.
Middle management’s strategic activities have in common their attempts to
influence the strategic direction of the organization. These attempts occur in the context
of strategic change. A form of strategic change called, “strategic renewal” is
characterized by the renewal of capabilities (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). The literature
recognizes two basic types of strategic renewal: (1) discontinuous strategic renewal and
(2) incremental renewal (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009). According to Floyd and Wooldridge
(2000), strategic renewal includes three interrelated elements or sub-processes: idea
generation, initiative development, and strategic reintegration. A long succession of
social interactions within and outside the organization occurs in each of these subprocesses. Middle managers’ strategic roles and strategic role conflict take place within
the context of the strategic renewal sub-processes. Strategic role enactment is a highly
social and political process sensitive to the health of relationships that is disrupted when
strategic role conflict occurs. This connection between strategic role conflict and role
enactment is the reason why it is important to understand strategic role conflict.
A competence-based view of the strategic renewal process identifies three subprocesses of renewal: competence deployment, competence modification, and
competence definition. Floyd and Lane (2000) proposed a theoretical framework that
maps ten strategic roles of top, middle, and operating managers to these three strategic
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renewal sub-processes. Top managers’ strategic roles include ratifying strategic
initiatives, recognizing the strategic potential of initiatives, and directing the deployment
of resources. Middle managers’ roles include championing alternatives, synthesizing
information, facilitating adaptability, and implementing given strategy. Operating
managers’ roles include experimenting with new capabilities, adjusting to challenging
environmental conditions, and conforming to top managers’ strategic directives.
Dissimilar perceptions and interpretations of the environment lead managers at different
levels to different conclusions of what strategic roles are appropriate resulting in strategic
role conflict.
2.2.3 Relevance of the Middle Manager’s Demographic Characteristics
Kahn et al. (1964) studied the effects of an individual’s personality on his or her
experience of role conflict. The authors argued that observed dissimilarities among
individuals’ experience of role conflict from the pressures of conflicting expectations
could not be attributed only to “objective differences in their jobs nor in the specific form
of their role conflict” (Kahn et al., 1964, p. 226). The authors theorized that differences
in the personalities of the individuals involved also made a difference in their experience
of role conflict. Kahn et al. (1964) posited that individual characteristics of the focal
person made an impact on role conflict because they would: (1) affect the expectations
sent by role senders, (2) affect the emotional reaction to stress, and (3) because
personality factors lead to individual differences in coping techniques used to handle
stress (Kahn et al., 1964). The authors looked at personality attributes such as neurotic
anxiety vs. emotional stability, favorable vs. unfavorable self-esteem, flexibility vs.
rigidity, extroversion vs. introversion, and aggressive independence vs. genial
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responsiveness. Kahn et al. (1964) found significant evidence to support their thesis that
personality factors account for differences in role conflict.
The early management literature (e.g., Selznick, 1949) focused on the influence of
management on organizational performance. An important branch of this research
focuses on the links between the top management team characteristics and a variety of
organizational outcomes (Bantel, 1993; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel,
1992). Two important theoretical developments in organizational studies led to this
trend. Cyert and March (1963) developed the concept of the dominant coalition, which
argued for a shift in the level of analysis from the individual CEO to the entire top
management team. The second development was the increased emphasis on using
observable demographic characteristics (e.g., age, tenure, experience, education level,
etc) as proxies for internal cognitive phenomena and exploring the relationship between
these characteristics and organizational outcomes (e.g., Bantel, 1993; Michel &
Hambrick, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
Hambrick and Mason (1984) wrote the seminal paper in top management team
research by uniting the dominant coalition and demographic characteristics streams of
research. The authors argued that the internal characteristics of upper level managers
(e.g., cognitive bases, values, and perceptions) influence their perceptions and their
decisions. The authors further argued that observable demographic characteristics could
be used as proxies for these internal characteristics. Thus, at the heart of the top
management teams perspective is the belief that the background, experiences, and values
of corporate executives influence their strategic decisions via internal cognitive
processes. Finally, according to Hambrick and Mason (1984) observable characteristics
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such as age, tenure, and functional experience might serve as useful proxies for the
cognitive base that guides top manager’s perceptions and decisions.
Combining the role conflict literature (e.g., Kahn et al., 1964) with the top
management literature (e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984), I argue that middle managers’
internal cognitive bases (which shape their personalities) also influence middle managers’
perceptions and the decisions that middle managers make regarding what strategic roles
are appropriate to enact. I further argue that middle managers’ demographic
characteristics can serve as proxies for the cognitive bases that shape their perceptions
and guide their decisions. Thus, the demographic characteristics of a middle manager are
likely antecedents to a middle manager’s experience of strategic role conflict.
2.2.4 Middle Manager’s Position within the Organization
A middle manager’s position within an organization has relevance to the
occurrence of strategic role conflict. Boundary spanning is often associated with role
conflict (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1958; Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Kahn et al.,
1964; Whetten, 1978). Managers in positions that are required to span the boundaries of
their departments or the boundaries of the organization are exposed to interactions with
different groups. These groups are likely to hold different values and interests. In
consequence, these groups are likely to have conflicting expectations of the boundaryspanning manager about what role to play, how to behave, what values to spouse, and
what interests to represent (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1958; Friedman & Podolny,
1992; Kahn et al., 1964; Whetten, 1978). As a result, it is likely that the boundaryspanning manager will experience conflicting expectations of what role to fulfill. These
conflicting expectations lead to stress because of the difficulty of satisfying the different
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groups and the lack of trust in the boundary-spanning manager shown by the different
groups (Adams, 1976; Miles, 1976; Organ, 1971; Organ & Greene, 1972; Van Sell, Brief,
and Schuler, 1981). Furthermore, relations with the different parties tend to deteriorate
because each group worries that the boundary-spanning manager is being influenced by
other groups to behave in ways that work against their own interests (Adams, 1976). It is
important to examine the effect of middle manager’s boundary-spanning positions
because it has been shown that organizational effectiveness is impaired as a result of this
role conflict (Kahn et al., 1964).
There is empirical evidence that organizational structure, specifically the number
of hierarchical layers of management, influences a middle manager’s perceptions of his
or her strategic role (Carney, 2004; Currie & Procter, 2005). A flatter structure enhances
downward communication and information flow allowing middle managers’ involvement
in strategy development and a clearer understanding of their strategic role (Carney,
2004). According to Floyd and Wooldridge (1992), managers at lower levels of middle
management engage less frequently in the upward influencing roles of “synthesizing
information” and “championing alternatives”. As a result, the authors suggest that
middle managers should not be considered as a monolithic group, but that the relationship
between their contribution to strategy and their hierarchical position in the organization
should be taken into account. Currie and Procter (2005) report a case study in which
middle managers sabotaged a strategic initiative because their geographical distance from
the center of the organization contributed to their not being asked to participate in the
development of the strategy and as a result they misunderstood their strategic role. Thus,
all the above characteristics of a middle manager’s position in the organization discussed
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in this section can contribute to the amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the
middle manager.

2.3 Social / Relational Exchange Theory
Social / relational exchange theory is based on the premise that individuals form
relationships based on mutual exchange to achieve benefits (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959;
Blau 1964). In a social exchange, an individual voluntarily provides a benefit to another
creating an obligation on the other to reciprocate by providing some benefit in return.
Parties involved in the exchange behave benevolently toward each other in the
expectation that the other party will behave benevolently in return (Blau, 1964; Macneil,
1974, 1978, 1980). Social exchange theory posits that exchanges are embedded in a
social context (Granovetter, 1985). Social exchanges are less formal and involve more
uncertainty than economic exchanges because of their voluntary nature (Das & Teng,
2002). As a result, social exchanges are primarily based on trust. As times passes and
mutually beneficial exchanges are completed, trust and commitment develop and grow
(Thibaut and Kelley 1959, Blau 1964).
In contrast to economic exchanges, social exchanges have several fundamental
differences (Blau, 1964). First, whereas economic exchanges are always extrinsic and
have economic value, social exchanges may provide both extrinsic benefits with direct
economic value (e.g., information and advice) and intrinsic benefits without any direct
economic value (e.g., social support). In addition, the extrinsic benefits of a social
exchange are often expressions of friendship and support that also have intrinsic value.
Thus, exchanges that have little or unclear economic benefit can have a strong impact on
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the social aspect of a relationship. Second, whereas benefits in economic exchanges are
often stated in explicitly negotiated contracts, the benefits of social exchanges are rarely
specified a priori or explicitly negotiated at all (Blau, 1964). Thus, providing or
reciprocating benefits is completely voluntary. Finally, since such behavior is voluntary,
there is no guarantee that benefits will ever be reciprocated or that reciprocation will
result in receipt of future benefits (i.e., the exchange of benefits involves uncertainty). In
consequence, relationships evolve slowly and the possibility of opportunism is always
present in a social relationship (Blau, 1964).
Social exchanges are very frequently successful in regulating behavior because
relational norms are used instead of contracts or other legal mechanisms (Thibaut and
Kelley, 1959). Relational exchanges are the basis of clan controls (Ouchi, 1979, 1980).
Parties involved in social exchange agree that the outcomes of the exchange are greater
than could be obtained otherwise. This mutual agreement motivates the parties to
consider the relationship intrinsically important, and as a result they are willing to invest
in the development and maintenance of the relationship. Such exchange relationships are
characterized by the presence of norms associated with the creation, preservation, and
harmonization of the relationship (Goles & Chin, 2002). Among the norms of relational
exchange are role integrity, relationship preservation, and harmonization of conflict.
Role integrity provides for stability and for the possibility of role expansion.
Relationship preservation reflects mutual perceptions of the relationship as important, not
merely transactional, and with expectations for its longevity. Harmonization of conflict
implies mutual satisfaction in the resolution of conflicts (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000). As
reliance on trust among the parties increases over time, informal psychological contracts
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are posited to compensate or substitute for the safety of formal contracts (Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994).
Relational exchanges are characterized by context. To understand a relational
exchange, it is important to understand the past, present, and expected future interactions
between the parties. Discrete transactions differ from relational exchanges along the
following dimensions: First, relational exchanges transpire over time; there is a history
and a presumed future. The basis of future collaboration is usually supported by implicit
and explicit assumptions, trust, and planning. Second, relational exchange participants
expect to derive complex, personal, non-economic benefits from the social exchange.
Third, customized mechanisms to regulate collaboration and to resolve conflict may be
designed and on occasion third parties may be called in to arbitrate (Macneil, 1974, 1978,
1980).
2.3.1 Quality of the Relationship between Middle Managers and Top Managers
Strategic role conflict is the focus of this dissertation. As stated before, strategic
role conflict occurs in the context of strategic renewal. Relational exchange theory can
be applied to the understanding of strategic renewal and thus strategic role conflict by
focusing on the effect of relational exchanges on the quality of the relationship between
managers. Strategic renewal implies the development and accumulation of new
capabilities or the effective implementation of top-down strategy (depending on the
strategic renewal sub process appropriate for the environmental conditions), which
depend on information flows, knowledge exchange, and knowledge recombination in the
interaction of top, middle, and operating managers, (Floyd & Lane, 2000). The
effectiveness of the information flows depends on managers having close, direct, and
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productive contact with each other. According to Ring and Van de Ven (1994), tacit
knowledge and other intangible assets can be more easily deployed through relational
exchanges. Interpersonal relationships and interactions are effective mechanisms to
transfer tacit knowledge because relational exchanges promote the development of
mutual trust, respect, and friendship (Kale et al. 2000). Mutual trust, respect, and
friendship are characteristics of a close, direct relationship between individuals that help
minimize dissimilarities in expectations because they promote understanding through
effective knowledge transfer (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale et al. 2000), which, as stated
earlier, is critical in creating and sustaining innovation in organizations or for effective
implementation of current strategy (Grant 1996a; Grant 1996b; Helfat & Raubitschek,
2000; Kale et al. 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Koza et al. 1998).
Therefore, the effectiveness of relational exchanges is key to an effective strategic
renewal process as they help minimize strategic role conflict through the exchange of
knowledge about environmental conditions. Thus, it is important to understand the effect
of the quality of the relationship between middle managers and top managers on strategic
role conflict because of its theorized detrimental effect on strategic role enactment and
ultimately on strategic renewal.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 General Conceptual Framework
This chapter integrates the work presented in Chapter 2 in an overall conceptual
model for the proposed research. A group of testable hypotheses is presented. The
hypotheses reflect expected relationships between strategic role conflict and its
antecedents, namely: (1) demographic characteristics of the middle manager as
independent variable and strategic role conflict as dependent variable, (2) nature of the
middle manager’s position within the organization as independent variable and strategic
role conflict as dependent variable, (3) dissimilarity in environmental perceptions
between the middle manager versus his or her top manager as independent variable and
strategic role conflict as dependent variable, (4) quality of the relationship between the
middle manager and his or her top manager as independent variable and strategic role
performance as dependent variable. The general model is presented in the following
section.

3.2 General Model
Figure 3.1 presents the overall conceptual model on which this research rests. At
its highest level of abstraction, the model indicates that middle managers’ strategic role
conflict is related to several antecedents. These are: demographic characteristics of the
middle manager, nature of the middle manager’s position within the organization,
dissimilarity in environmental perceptions between the middle manager and his or her top
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manager, and the quality of the relationship between the middle manager and his or her
top manager.

Figure 3.1
General Strategic Role Conflict Model

Demographic
Characteristics
of the Middle
Manager

Nature of
Middle
Manager’s
Position within
the
Organization

1

2

Strategic Role
Conflict
Dissimilarity in
Environmental
Perceptions visà-vis his/her
Top Manager

3

+
4

Quality of the
Middle
Manager’s
Relationship
with his/her
Top Manager
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3.2.1 Hypotheses Regarding Demographic Characteristics of Middle Managers and
Strategic Role Conflict
As discussed in chapter 2 in the section reviewing the role conflict literature,
Kahn et al. (1964) found that internal personality characteristics were related to
employees’ experience of role conflict. The top management literature, also reviewed in
chapter 2, argued for and found supportive evidence that demographic characteristics of
top managers could proxy for their internal cognitive bases. This literature defined a
“cognitive base” as assumptions about the future, awareness and understanding of
alternatives, and the likely consequences of these alternatives (e.g., Hambrick & Mason,
1984; March & Simon, 1958; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In this section, I use the
demographic characteristics of middle managers to proxy for their cognitive bases and
extend the role conflict literature into the strategic conflict literature by proposing testable
hypotheses regarding middle managers’ demographic characteristics and their experience
of strategic role conflict.
An empirical connection between personality traits and role conflict was made by
Kahn et al.’s (1964). According to Kahn et al.’s (1964) findings, personality
characteristics such as neurotic anxiety vs. emotional stability, favorable vs. unfavorable
self-esteem, flexibility vs. rigidity, extroversion vs. introversion, and aggressive
independence vs. genial responsiveness were related to the employee’s experience of role
conflict because they affected the expectations sent by role senders, affected the
emotional reaction to stress, and led to individual differences in coping techniques used
to handle stress. These constructs represent personality traits but also to some degree
mental health. Another dimension to an individual’s personality is the extent to which a
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person’s outlook represents a mature approach to external events. Hogan and Roberts
(2004) argued that maturity is a personality trait that is most productively viewed from
the perspective of the actor and of the observer and that it should be measured from two
perspectives – how people feel about themselves and how others feel about them.
Mayseless and Scharf (2003) define emotional maturity as, “the capacity to control
impulses, the adoption of a broad and unselfish perspective, and acceptance of
responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions” (p.6). According to other authors,
emotional maturity is related to an individual's ability to be appropriately assertive and
cope effectively with external pressures and adversity (Azuma, 1984; Helms, 1995;
Sandoz, 1992). For example, Lawton, Kleban, Rajagopal, and Dean (1992) found that
older adults were higher in emotional control, mood stability, and emotional maturity
than younger adults. Their findings support the hypothesis that self-regulatory capacity
increases with age. Neugarten and Neugarten (1996) argued that that age differences in
social roles, relationships, and socio-emotional outlook influence the risk of angry
emotionality. Support for this notion came from Schieman’s (1999) random study of 951
Canadian adults and 1,450 American adults. The author found an essentially negative
linear relationship between age and anger. That is, older people experienced and
expressed significantly less anger than younger people did. Having established the
association of age with emotional maturity, I now turn my attention to the role of age in
strategy making.
In the management literature, Cyert & March (1963) argued that an individual's
cognitive base evolves from experiences, including training and background, and
Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that demographic characteristics of individuals are
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indicators of the qualities of said cognitive base. In particular, Hambrick and Mason
(1984) proposed that the age of a top executive would be related to a company’s growth
and riskier strategies. The use of demography is based on research that has found a link
between demographic characteristics and specific beliefs, values, and abilities.
Demography has been used as a predictor of beliefs, values, and viewpoints (Dearborn &
Simon, 1958; Kahalas & Groves, 1979; Walsh, 1988; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). For
instance, several authors have found that age is negatively related to the ability to
integrate new information and to the tendency to make risky decisions (Carlson &
Karlsson, 1970; Taylor, 1975; Vroom & Pahl, 1971). And that managerial age is
positively associated with a tendency to seek more information, to evaluate the
information more accurately, and to take longer to make decisions (Hambrick & Mason,
1984; Taylor, 1975). I argue that since age is positively related to maturity and since
maturity is positively related to a tendency to search for more information and to take the
time to evaluate it adequately, older middle managers would avert unnecessary disparities
in the conclusions they draw from the information they gather and would be more in
agreement with the conclusions that the top managers to whom they report draw than
younger middle managers. Therefore, in line with the research laid out and the reasoning
presented above, the following hypothesis is offered:

Hypothesis 1a: The chronological age of a middle manager will be
negatively associated with the amount of strategic role conflict
experienced by the middle manager.
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In addition, the fact remains that there is another role sender that holds
expectations of the strategic behavior of the middle manager, in addition to the middle
manager’s own expectations. That is of course the top manager to whom the middle
manager reports. Consequently, the age of the top manager to whom the middle manager
reports also has to be taken into account. A reason why it is important to consider the age
difference between a middle manager and the top manager to whom he or she reports is
that difference in the amount of life experience and on the content of those life
experiences can lead to different conclusions regarding external stimuli and to different
strategic role expectations and behaviors. The logic for a connection between the
differences in ages of managers comes from the diversity perspective. For instance,
extant literature suggests that a team’s demographic homogeneity is linked to its
propensity to maintain the strategic status quo. Authors have found that demographic
homogeneity leads to perceptions of similarity with and attraction to others (Byrne, 1961;
Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). When people are members of
the same cohort (i.e., when two or more people experience event such as birth and
organizational entry within the same time period), they are exposed to similar social,
environmental, and organizational events (Ryder, 1965; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
Furthermore, individuals with similar experiences, backgrounds, beliefs, and values
develop a shared language, which enhances their communication (Allen & Cohen, 1969;
O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989; Rhodes, 1983: Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly, 1984;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). Similar individuals are likely to
also develop solidarity, sponsorship, and mutual choice leading to congruence in their
beliefs and perceptions, to high consensus, and similar decisions (Dutton & Duncan,
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1987; Pfeffer, 1983; Janis, 1972; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Reed, 1978; Wagner et
al., 1984). Demographic heterogeneity has the opposite effects. Organizational theorists
have argued that teams high in demographic diversity on the variables of age and
organizational tenure find it more difficult to communicate than do groups composed of
members of the same cohort, leading to conflict and power struggles because at high
levels of diversity communication becomes increasingly strained and riddled with
conflict (McCain, O'Reilly, & Pfeffer, 1983; Pfeffer, 1983; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
Having established a connection between demographic heterogeneity and lack of
congruence in beliefs, perceptions, consensus, and similar decisions, I now turn my
attention to the link between age-related differences and conflict per se.
Evidence supporting the importance of age-related differences on conflict comes
from the conflict management literature. One aspect related to age differences in dyadic
conflict that has been documented in the conflict management literature is how
differences in cohort influence conflict interactions and also conflict management
strategies (Silars & Wilmot, 1989; Silars & Zietlow, 1993). These authors found
evidence that married couples of different cohorts used different conflict management
styles at different life stages; specifically, younger couples were more combative and
controlling than older couples (Silars & Wilmot, 1989; Silars & Zietlow, 1993).
Bergstrom and Nussbaum (1996) found significant differences in conflict behaviors and
satisfaction with those behaviors between older and younger adults. Based on the
preceding discussion, I offer the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1b: The difference in chronological age between a middle
manager and the top manager to whom the middle manager reports will be
positively associated with the amount of strategic role conflict experienced
by the middle manager.

Another demographic characteristic that can proxy for a person’s internal
cognitive base is a person’s formal education. According to Hambrick and Mason
(1984), a person’s formal education indicates, to some degree, the person’s knowledge
and skill base. The authors suggest that if we assume that most people take seriously
their decisions about education, then formal education serves to some extent as an
indicator of a person's values and cognitive preferences. There is no evidence in the
literature to suggest that any one particular educational background might lead to greater
strategic role conflict if we look at it in a vacuum. However, there is evidence that years
of formal education, in general, provide individuals with valuable skills to cope with
increased information processing demands (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The authors
proposed that the amount of formal education of a management team would be associated
with receptivity to innovation; probably because the more a person is exposed to
education, the more a person learns to have an open mind. Having an open mind is
associated with flexibility. Kahn et al. (1964) found that a flexible coping style is
associated with less role conflict because when a person with a flexible coping style is
confronted with a situation that does not fit his or her conceptual framework, the flexible
person is more likely to assume that his or her expectations are not appropriate for the
situation. As such, the person with a flexible coping style will be more willing to
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accommodate another role sender’s expectations and reduce role conflict. Based on the
preceding discussion, I offer the following formal hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1c: A middle manager’s amount of years of formal education
will be negatively associated with the amount of strategic role conflict
experienced by the middle manager.

As was the case with the middle manager’s chronological age, the effect of the
amount of years of formal education of the middle manager cannot be seen in isolation
only. It also has to be seen in the context of the years of education of the top manager to
whom the middle manager reports. The diversity argument presented in the discussion of
age-related diversity is appropriate here too. As stated in the preceding section, a
person’s level of education is a reflection of the individual’s cognitive ability and skills.
That is, an individual’s cognitive base evolves from experiences, including training and
background, and demographic characteristics of individuals are indicators of the quality
of their cognitive base (Cyert & March, 1963; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Schroder,
Driver, and Streufert (1967) found that high levels of education are associated with high
capacity for information processing and ability to discriminate among many of stimuli.
Educated individuals are more likely to engage in boundary spanning, tolerate ambiguity,
and show increased ability to integrate complexity (Dollinger, 1984). In addition, many
studies have found consistent evidence for a positive relationship between high
educational level and innovation (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Becker, 1970; Kimberly
& Evanisko, 1981; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). According to the diversity argument,
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demographic diversity in teams leads to conflict and power struggles because at high
levels of diversity communication becomes increasingly strained and riddled with
conflict as a result of the disparity in individual views (McCain, O'Reilly, & Pfeffer,
1983; Pfeffer, 1983; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Therefore, two individuals who are
vastly different in terms of years of formal education will arrive at significantly different
conclusions regarding external stimuli, develop different propensities to respond,
disagree in their approaches, and arrive at different expectations for each other’s
behaviors because of their different cognitive bases. Since years of formal education is
related to an individual’s type of conclusions regarding stimuli and to the type of
response to those stimuli, and since differences in conclusions and approaches is linked to
poor communication and different expectations, the difference in years of formal
education between the middle manager and the top manager to whom the middle
manager reports can be a predictor of their likely agreement or disagreement as to what
external events mean for the organization’s strategy. Based on preceding argument, I
offer the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1d: The difference in years of formal education between a
middle manager and the top manager to whom the middle manager reports
will be positively associated with the amount of strategic role conflict
experienced by the middle manager.
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3.2.2 Hypotheses Regarding the Nature of Middle Manager’s Position within the
Organization and Strategic Role Conflict
There is evidence in the literature that the nature of an employee’s position within
the organization is related to the amount of role conflict that the employee experiences.
Kahn et al. (1964) found that functional dependence, organizational proximity, and low
status differential were positively related to role conflict. However, when both the role
sender and the focal person became knowledgeable of the contribution of each of their
positions to organizational goals, of their mutual dependence, and of the impact that
changing their expectations would have on the organization, role conflict was reduced
(Kahn et al, 1964).
Boundary spanning is associated with role conflict because boundary-spanning
individuals have role senders in other locations such as different departments, different
divisions, or even external organizations (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1958; Friedman
& Podolny, 1992; Kahn et al., 1964; Whetten, 1978). Managers in positions that are
required to span the boundaries of their departments or the boundaries of the organization
are exposed to interactions with different groups where they interact with different role
senders. Role senders that belong to different groups are likely to have different values
and pursue different interests. As a result, they are likely to have conflicting expectations
of the boundary-spanning manager’s role, how to behave, what values to spouse, and
what interests to represent (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1958; Friedman & Podolny,
1992; Kahn et al., 1964; Whetten, 1978). Hence, it is likely that the boundary-spanning
manager will experience conflicting expectations of what role to fulfill. As discussed in
the review of the role conflict literature, conflicting expectations lead to stress because of
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the difficulty of satisfying the different groups and the lack of trust that the different
groups have in the boundary-spanning manager (Adams, 1976; Miles, 1976; Organ,
1971; Organ & Greene, 1972; Van Sell, Brief, and Schuler, 1981).
Furthermore, relations with the different parties tend to deteriorate because each
group worries that the boundary-spanning manager is being influenced by other groups to
behave in ways that work against their own interests and the different groups tend to put
increasingly greater pressure on the boundary-spanning manager (Adams, 1976). One
under-explored aspect of the effect of boundary-spanning activity of middle managers is
the effect that such activity has on strategic role conflict as a result of exposing the
middle manager to different points of view as to what environmental changes might mean
for the organization. It is likely that the groups outside the organization with whom the
middle manager interacts are not the same as the outside groups with whom top managers
interact. When top managers engage in boundary-spanning activities, it tends to be with
groups representing the capital markets, whereas when middle managers engage in
boundary-spanning activities, it tends to occur as they support operating managers in
interactions with customers and suppliers (Floyd & Lane, 2000). As a result, this
disparity translates into intra-organizational disagreements as to what type of change is
needed in the organization or whether any change is needed at all. Top managers tend to
view external changes as temporary fluctuations not indicating a need for major internal
change, whereas middle managers tend to view external changes as indications that
strategic change is necessary. Conversely, non-boundary-spanning middle managers are
only exposed to the expectations that other members belonging to their group, including
their top manager, have of them. Non-boundary-spanning middle managers do not have
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to contend with groups that have different expectations of their behavior and exert
conflicting pressures. In addition, non-boundary spanning middle managers are also not
exposed to groups whose views differ from the views of the groups that their top manager
interacts with. Those two sources of differential exposure to dissimilar expectations, lead
me to offer the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2a: Middle managers in boundary-spanning positions will
experience a greater amount of strategic role conflict than middle
managers in non-boundary-spanning positions.

Since the focus of the present study is on strategic role conflict, most strategic
role conflict will involve vertical interactions with top managers. Thus, organizational
distance of a middle manager from a top manager is the focus of this section. There is
empirical evidence that organizational structure, specifically the number of hierarchical
layers of management, influences a middle manager’s perceptions of his or her strategic
role (Carney, 2004; Currie & Procter, 2005). A flatter structure enhances downward
communication and information flow allowing for middle managers’ involvement in
strategy and a clearer understanding of their strategic role (Carney, 2004). Floyd and
Wooldridge (1992) found that middle managers at lower levels of the organization
engaged less frequently in upward influencing roles (i.e., synthesizing information and
championing alternatives). As a result, middle managers should not be considered as a
monolithic group, but the relationship between their contribution to strategy and their
hierarchical position in the organization should be taken into account (Floyd &
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Wooldridge, 1992). Currie and Procter (2005) found that middle managers
misunderstood their strategic role and sabotaged a strategic initiative because they were
not asked to participate in the development of the strategy as a result of their large
geographical distance from the center of the organization. Thus, a middle manager’s
position in the organization can contribute to the amount of strategic role conflict
experienced by the middle manager. There are several reasons why a middle manager’s
relative position in the organization would lead to greater role conflict. First, the closer
middle managers are from their top managers, the greater the observability of their
behavior. Kahn et al. (1964) found that organizational proximity was positively related
to role conflict precisely because role senders were able to increase their pressure on the
focal person as they observed deviations in the focal person’s behavior from what the role
sender expected. Another reason for the increased pressure on focal persons who are
closer to role senders is the functional dependence of the role sender on the performance
of the focal person. Kahn et al.’s (1964) found that the closer a focal person was to his
or her role sender, the more that the performance of the role sender depended on the
performance of the focal person. Thus, as a role sender has more at stake in the behavior
of the focal person, the more pressure that the role sender will put on the focal person to
comply with the role sender’s expectations. Proximity and frequency of communication
would enable the top manager to exert the increased pressure. Based on the preceding
discussion, I offer the following hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 2b: Middle managers higher in the organizational hierarchy
will experience a greater amount of strategic role conflict than middle
managers lower in the organizational hierarchy.
Hypothesis 2c: The frequency of communication between the middle
manager and the top manager to whom the middle manager reports will be
positively associated with the amount of strategic role conflict experienced
by the middle manager.

3.2.3 Hypothesis Regarding Differences in Environmental Perceptions and Strategic
Role Conflict
The literature documents many reasons for why managers at different levels in the
organization have different perceptions of the environment. Environmental dynamism is
theorized to play a key role in the emergence and severity of strategic role conflict by
eliciting different perceptions and interpretations of the need for and the type of change
and by leading to different conclusions at different managerial levels of what strategic
renewal sub process should be used; and therefore, what strategic roles are appropriate to
enact (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Under highly complex, highly dynamic conditions,
managers may be uncertain whether change is necessary and unclear what kind of change
is appropriate. As a result, the likelihood of confusion regarding what strategic role is
expected of them is increased (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Huff et al., 1992). This occurs
because changes in the external environment provide clues for organizational change
(Floyd & Lane, 2000), and these clues in turn have to be interpreted for meaning (Weick,
1995). Manager’s interpretations can vary from accurate representations of objective
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measures of environmental uncertainty and complexity to completely flawed perceptions,
and individual interpretations also can vary from each other (Bourgeois, 1980; Lorenzi,
Sims, & Slocum, 1979). For example, Tosi, Aldag, and Storey (1973) found no
significant correlations when comparing managers’ responses on Lawrence and Lorsch’s
(1967) perceived uncertainty scale to actual variability in the respondents’ industries. In
complex, dynamic environments the combination of increased unpredictability,
heterogeneity, and distorted individual perceptions increase the likelihood that individual
manager’s interpretations would differ from each other and prescribe different
approaches and behaviors (Floyd & Lane, 2000). This has important consequences for
the organization because role expectations are formed from these perceptions and
prescribe what managerial roles and behaviors are appropriate.
Under conditions of high complexity and rapid environmental change, different
layers of management are likely to attach different meanings for the organization to the
environmental changes that they observe. Middle managers may interpret unexpected
customers’ demands or rapidly changing technology reported by operating managers as
cues for radical strategic change. On the other hand, top managers do not have day-today contact with customers but interact frequently with representatives of the capital
markets who tend to have a more conservative view of the environment and tend to be
more committed to the status quo (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Floyd & Lane, 2000).
Hence, different perceptions lead to divergent interpretations among levels of
management of what the environmental change implies for the organization, what
strategic renewal sub-process is indicated, and hence divergent expectations over what
strategic roles each level of management should enact (Floyd & Lane, 2000). These
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contradictory views act as pressure on lower-level managers to react in the way in which
the top manager perceives it. It is likely that the greater the dissimilarity in perceptions
the greater the pressure exerted and the greater the strategic role conflict experienced
(Biddle, 1979; Floyd & Lane, 2000).
In summary, given that individual managers have variability in their
interpretations of environmental cues (Bourgeois, 1980; Lorenzi, Sims, & Slocum, 1979;
Tosi, Aldag, & Storey, 1973), given that uncertainty and complexity in the environment
will result in more cues to be interpreted, given that the level of management that
managers occupy further determines their perceptions and shapes their interpretations,
and given that their interpretations determine the role expectations that they form for
themselves and for others, I offer the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: The difference in environmental perceptions between the
middle manager and the top manager to whom he or she reports is
positively associated with the amount of strategic role conflict experienced
by the middle manager.
Hypothesis 3.1: The difference in environmental perceptions of
the product markets between the middle manager and the top
manager to whom he or she reports is positively associated with
the amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.
Hypothesis 3.2: The difference in environmental perceptions of
the factor markets between the middle manager and the top
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manager to whom he or she reports is positively associated with
the amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.

3.2.4 Hypothesis Regarding the Quality of the Relationship Middle Manager / Top
Manager and Strategic Role Conflict
In chapter 2, I reviewed the literature on relational exchange theory. Following
Floyd and Lane (2000), I argued that roles, role expectations, and strategic role conflict
within strategic renewal can be better understood under the lens of relational exchange by
focusing on the effect of relational exchanges on the quality of the relationship between
different layers of management. As stated earlier, depending on environmental
conditions and on the strategic renewal sub process appropriate for those environmental
conditions, strategic renewal implies either the development and accumulation of new
capabilities or the effective implementation of given strategy, both of which depend on
information flows, knowledge exchange, and knowledge recombination in the interaction
of top, middle, and operating managers (Floyd & Lane, 2000). The effectiveness of the
information flows depends on managers having close, direct, and productive contact with
each other. According to Ring and Van de Ven (1994), tacit knowledge and other
intangible assets can be more easily deployed through relational exchanges.
Interpersonal relationships and interactions are effective mechanisms to transfer tacit
knowledge because relational exchanges promote the development of a quality
interpersonal relationship based on mutual trust, respect, and friendship (Kale et al. 2000;
Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). A close, direct relationship between individuals
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characterized by mutual trust, respect, and friendship helps minimize dissimilarities in
expectations by promoting understanding through effective knowledge transfer (Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Kale et al. 2000), which is critical in creating and sustaining innovation in
organizations or for effective implementation of current strategy (Grant 1996a; Grant
1996b; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Kale et al. 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut &
Zander,1996; Koza et al. 1998). Thus, the quality of an interpersonal relationship would
play a vital role in reducing middle managers’ strategic role conflict by reducing the
discrepancy in expectations between top managers and middle managers. Based on this
discussion, I offer the following general hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The quality of the relationship between a middle manager
and the top manager to whom he or she reports will be negatively
associated with the amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the
middle manager.
Kahn et al. (1964) identified interpersonal relations as a factor in role relations.
The authors identified three types of interpersonal role relations (i.e., formal role
relations, informal interpersonal bonds, and interaction processes) that one must consider
that render the relationship between a role sender and a focal person unique. Informal
interpersonal bonds refer to patterns of cognitive and affective orientation between two
persons in a relationship that can have an effect on the quality of their relationship and
the effectiveness of their communication. Under informal interpersonal bonds, Kahn et
al. (1964) found that trust in senders was associated with a lower degree of role conflict.
Trust defined as the degree to which one party has the willingness to be vulnerable to
another party’s actions based on the expectation that the other party (i.e., the trustee) will
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perform a particular action important to the one party (i.e., the trustor), irrespective of the
one party’s ability to monitor or control the behavior of the other party (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995). Therefore, under conditions of higher trust, communication tends to
be more open, honest, and effective and help resolve conflicting expectations leading to
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.1: The degree of joint trust in the relationship
between a middle manager and the top manager to whom he or she
reports will be negatively associated with the amount of strategic
role conflict experienced by the middle manager.
On the other hand, if trust is not equally reciprocated, the one party experiencing
the lower trust would tend to hold back and undermine the efforts of the other party at
reaching consensus leading me to offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2: The degree of discrepancy in trust in the
relationship between a middle manager and the top manager to
whom he or she reports will be positively associated with the
amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.
Similarly, affective and affinity factors have an effect on role conflict because
they help improve the quality and effectiveness of communication and the resolution of
conflicting expectations. Affect helps minimize dissimilarities in expectations by
promoting understanding through effective knowledge transfer (Dyer & Singh, 1998;
Kale et al. 2000), which in turn leads to reduced role conflict. Kahn et al. (1964) found
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that respect for and liking of senders was associated with a lower degree of role conflict.
Thus, based on this discussion, I offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.3: The degree of joint affect in the relationship
between a middle manager and the top manager to whom he or she
reports will be negatively associated with the amount of strategic
role conflict experienced by the middle manager.
Similarly, if affect is not equally reciprocated, the one party experiencing the
lower affect would tend to have reservations and undermine the efforts of the other party
at reaching consensus thus leading me to hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4.4: The degree of discrepancy in affect in the
relationship between a middle manager and the top manager to
whom he or she reports will be positively associated with the
amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.
Two characteristics of a high-quality interpersonal relationship identified in the
literature are the cognitive flexibility and integrative bargaining orientation of the parties.
Cognitive flexibility is the extent to which the information exchange process between two
people is characterized by reflection, objective information review, use of different
perspectives, being open to hearing from the other party, having the capacity and
willingness to change one’s opinion, and developing a large variety of interpretations.
Parks (1994) argued that cognitive flexibility is an important aspect of communication
competence and conversational sensitivity, which are positively related to selfmonitoring, private self-consciousness, self-esteem, assertiveness, empathy, and social

47

skills and negatively related to communication apprehension, social anxiety, and receiver
apprehension (Daly, Vangelisti, & Daughton, 1987). There is empirical support for these
notions. For example, Chesebro and Martin (2003) found that conversational sensitivity
and cognitive flexibility were positively related and that cognitive flexibility was
inversely related to indirect interpersonal aggression. Cognitive flexibility affects
strategic decision quality and implementation quality through increased trust and
participative leadership and can have an ultimate positive effect on organizational
performance (Raes et al., 2011). According to Raes et al. (2011), cognitive flexibility
has an effect on strategic decision quality and implementation quality because
interactions between top managers and middle managers high in cognitive flexibility
result in higher probability of making high-quality decisions. This higher probability
results from top- and middle managers’ better understanding of the environment through
higher diversity of information, better understanding of cause-effect relationships,
broader range of creative interpretations, and greater generation of alternatives (Raes et
al., 2011). The preceding discussion demonstrates that cognitive flexibility is a
characteristic of positive, effective, high-quality interpersonal relationships and likely to
lead to reduced strategic role conflict. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4.5: The degree of joint cognitive flexibility in the
relationship between a middle manager and the top manager to
whom he or she reports will be negatively associated with the
amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.
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On the other hand, if only one party has high cognitive flexibility, the party with
lower cognitive flexibility would tend to hold hard to entrenched positions and undermine
the efforts of the other party at reaching consensus. Thus I offer the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.6: The degree of discrepancy in cognitive flexibility
in the relationship between a middle manager and the top manager
to whom he or she reports will be positively associated with the
amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.
Having discussed why cognitive flexibility is a characteristic of a high-quality
interpersonal relationship, now I turn my attention to the connection between integrative
bargaining and a high-quality interpersonal relationship. Integrative bargaining is the
degree to which two people try to find common or complementary interests that benefit
both parties rather than just one during their mutual influencing process (Raes, Heijltjes,
Glunk, and Roe (2011). When two parties engage in interaction, the extent to which
bargainers perceive a situation as integrative (win-win) or distributive (i.e., win-lose)
depends in part on the interaction between them (Putnam & Jones, 1982). An essential
factor in evolving from distributive to integrative bargaining is reciprocity. According to
social exchange theory, social exchanges are based on trust that the other party will
reciprocate benevolently and depend largely on an honest exchange of information (Blau,
1964; Gouldner, 1960; Macneil, 1974, 1978, 1980). Thus, trust and honest information
exchange are essential characteristics of high-quality interpersonal relationships where
reciprocity is the norm.
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In the organizational realm, integrative bargaining has been theorized to affect
strategic decision quality and implementation quality through increased trust and
participative leadership and can have an ultimate positive effect on organizational
performance (Raes et al., 2011). Furthermore, Raes et al. (2011) argued that integrative
bargaining has an effect on strategic decision quality and implementation quality. The
authors argued that interactions between the top management team and middle managers
characterized by high integrative bargaining would result in higher-quality decisions (p.
111). Raes et al. (2011) contended that this outcome results from top- and middle
managers’ better understanding of the environment through higher diversity of
information, better understanding of cause-effect relationships, broader range of creative
interpretations, and greater generation of alternatives. The authors further argued that
interaction between top- and middle managers high in integrative bargaining would result
in better implementation quality through cooperation, mutual value creation, increased
middle managers’ commitment to strategy implementation, better allocation of resources,
enhanced creativity of solutions generated, and improved understanding of the strategy.
In summary, Raes, et al. (2011) argued that integrative bargaining has a positive effect on
both strategic decision quality and implementation quality through an enhanced
understanding of the environment and a win-win orientation to problem solving that
enhances cooperation; that is, by enhancing the quality of the interpersonal relationship.
Based on the preceding discussion, I hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 4.7: The degree of joint integrative bargaining in the
relationship between the middle manager and the top manager to
whom he or she reports will be negatively associated with the
amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager.
Alternatively, if only one party is high in integrative bargaining, the party with
lower integrative bargaining would tend to concentrate on “winning”, hold win-lose
positions, and undermine the efforts of the other party at reaching consensus. Thus I
offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.8: The degree of discrepancy in integrative
bargaining in the relationship between a middle manager and the
top manager to whom he or she reports will be positively
associated with the amount of strategic role conflict experienced
by the middle manager.
The following section presents a methodology for testing the hypotheses that I
have offered.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
As stated in the introductory chapter, this dissertation explores the antecedents of
strategic role conflict as its research question. Specifically, this study provides an
empirical test of whether: (1) the demographic characteristics of middle managers, (2) the
nature of their position within the organization, (3) the quality of their relationships with
top management, and (4) the degree of dissimilarity of their environmental perceptions
vis-à-vis top management’s affect middle managers’ experience of strategic role conflict.
This chapter presents the methodology used to empirically test the hypotheses
offered in Chapter 3. First, the two specific conceptual models to be evaluated are
presented followed by a discussion of the design of the study. Then, the research setting
and sample are presented, followed by a description of the data collection methodology.
Next, a description of the measures that were used is discussed. The actual items used in
the survey are presented in the appendix. Finally, a description of the data analysis
methodology, primarily Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equations
Modeling (SEM) is presented, followed by description statistics and figures of the two
hybrid models that were tested.
4.1.1 Specific Conceptual Models
Two specific conceptual models, Model A and Model B, were tested. The more
parsimonious Model A uses twelve exogenous variables as predictors (see figure 4.1),
whereas the less parsimonious Model B uses fifteen exogenous variables as predictors of
the endogenous variable (see figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.1
Strategic Role Conflict – Model A
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Figure 4.2
Strategic Role Conflict – Model B
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The methodology delineated in this chapter is intended to answer the following
questions:
1. Which model provides the better fit to the data?
2. Does the better model have a reasonable fit to the data?
3. Are the links significant and in the hypothesized direction?
4. How much variance in the independent variable is explained by the
model?

4.2 Research Design
This dissertation examines the effects of several antecedents (i.e., demographic
characteristics of the middle manager, nature of the middle manager’s position within the
organization, quality of the relationship of the middle manager with his or her top
manager, and the degree of dissimilarity of environmental perceptions vis-à-vis his or her
top manager’s) on the middle manager’s amount of strategic role conflict. Therefore, a
cross-sectional field study was chosen as suitable to relate differences in these
antecedents to the amount of strategic role conflict experienced by middle managers at a
specific point in time. Another reason why a cross-sectional study is appropriate is that I
asked informants to retrospectively report on specific experiences. All middle managers
are theorized to experience some level of strategic role conflict irrespective of their
location within the organization.
4.3 Research Setting
An important condition for this study is an environment with a medium-high
degree of dynamism and a sufficient but moderate amount of munificence (Sharfman &
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Dean, 1991; Dess & Beard, 1984; Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 2005) that can lead to divergent
perceptions and expectations among top and middle managers, which in turn can lead to
strategic role conflict. A moderate amount of munificence should provide a minimum
amount of slack resources for managers to engage in divergent strategic initiatives. Too
little munificence is likely to lead to almost no opportunities for divergent behaviors,
whereas too much munificence is likely to lead to diminished strategic conflict.
The nature of the competitive environment was an important element in the
selection of the organization that ultimately was surveyed. An analysis of the
competitive environment helped identify a number of large organizations that were
experiencing significant but not drastic change in their environment. Consequently,
environment signals were unclear as to whether middle managers should be trying to
renew their capabilities to adapt to the changing conditions or whether they should hone
their current competencies to better implement their current strategy.
Dess and Beard (1984) showed that higher levels of environmental dynamism are
displayed by higher rates of turnover unpredictability. Accordingly, eighty-six four-digit
NAICS Manufacturing Industries and thirty-four three-digit NAICS Service Industries
were ranked by their degree of dynamism based on the degree of unpredictability of
annual revenue using yearly revenue data from 2006 to 2011 obtained from the U. S.
Annual Survey of Manufacturers and yearly revenue data from 2008 to 2013 obtained
from the U. S. Annual Survey of Service Companies. Industries were classified as high,
medium-high, medium-low, and low dynamism if they fell in the 25% above the 3rd
quartile, 25% above the 2nd quartile, 25% above the 1st quartile, and 25% below the 1st
quartile brackets ranked by unpredictability of annual revenue. In total, there were thirty
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medium-high dynamism industries. From those thirty industries, all publicly held active
profitable companies with annual sales of more than $500 million were extracted from
COMPUSTAT. In total, two hundred medium-high dynamism companies were
identified, and a random sample of 30 companies were contacted. After contacting the 30
companies, a final company was selected as the subject based on the size of its revenues,
profitability, and willingness to participate in the study.
The research site chosen was a large, global manufacturing company based in the
United States. The company employs over 50,000 people worldwide. The organization,
to be referred to here as Subject Company, has revenues of over $20 billion and profits in
excess of $500 million. Subject Company currently finds itself in a difficult competitive
situation. Changing communication technologies and globalization have been posing
challenges to the company’s traditional businesses and strategy for several years.
Two divisions within Subject Company participated in the study. Both divisions
have substantial levels of revenues and profits, and both face similar and significant
dynamism in their environments. There is nothing interestingly different between the
two divisions in their competitive environments that would suggest that their
environmental context should not be considered the same. Therefore, the data collected
from both divisions was combined for purposes of this study.
4.4 Sample
The population of interest is middle managers. The sample frame consisted of all
US-based middle managers working within the two participant divisions. The sampling
method was comprehensive. That is, invitations were sent to all middle managers that
met this criterion for the population: Middle managers were defined as individuals
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holding managerial responsibilities supervising employees or supervising a function who
are higher in the organizational hierarchy than first-level supervisors and lower than
individuals reporting directly to the CEO (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Wooldridge &
Floyd, 1990; Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd, 2008). The large size of Subject Company
provided the possibility of surveying a sufficient number of middle managers within the
two participant divisions. An invitation to participate in the study was sent to all the
middle managers within the two divisions. A sample of 249 middle managers was
obtained. The hierarchical breakdown was 6 percent two levels below the CEO, 23
percent three levels below, 44 percent four levels below, and 27 percent five levels below
the CEO. Two hundred thirty two (232) complete surveys were received. The remaining
17 surveys had missing data in varying degrees but all were used in the analysis (N=249).
The top managers leading the participating divisions were also surveyed to match their
responses with their middle managers’.
The 249 surveys received represent a combined 30% response rate. The response
rates for each division were 28% and 32% respectively. Given that quantitative crosssectional data was collected, this sample size was large enough to provide for robust
statistical results (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009; Tsui & Gutek, 1984). For
purposes of comparing demographic characteristics, differences in environmental
perceptions, and quality of relationship middle manager / top manager, middle managers
responses were paired with the responses of the respective top manager to whom their
line of command reports, irrespective of whether the middle manager reported directly to
the top manager or not. The top managers of each division were over fifty years old, had
graduate education (MBA), more than twenty five years with the company, and more
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than five years leading their respective divisions. For middle managers, individual
demographic characteristics such as age, years of formal education, tenure with the
company, and tenure within the industry were collected for purposes of characterizing the
sample. Despite limitations regarding generalizability, using a sample from a single
company has been an accepted procedure for testing theory since a homogeneous sample
from a single population provides a rigorous test of the theoretical constructs and
relationships and controls for spurious differences found when sample subjects have
unique circumstances (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981). Data from the 25 pre-test
survey respondents were not part of 249 surveys that were used in the final statistical
analyses.

4.5 Procedure / Data Collection / Anonymity
A survey instrument to collect data from respondents was developed and pretested prior to its use. There were 25 respondents to the pre-test. Learning from the pretest resulted in important revisions to the survey instrument. The changes resulted in a
shorter survey as specific items that the respondents found confusing were clarified. In
addition, a factor analysis of the pre-test responses resulted in the elimination of items
that did not correlate well with the remaining items in its scale. Finally, the pre-test
confirmed that the survey generated substantial variance across the 25 respondents.
Most sections of the survey were comprised largely of 7-point Likert-type
response formats. The content of the survey instrument was based on a review of role
conflict and middle management research, which provided a framework for measuring
specific constructs of interest. This involved consulting published research in role
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conflict, middle management, trust, negotiation, and organizational psychology.
Wherever possible, I used previously validated scales to measure my constructs. For
example, quantitative measures derived from existing measures that have been
empirically validated to measure managerial perceptions regarding the environment as
well as strategic role conflict were used (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Floyd & Wooldridge,
1992, 1997; Rizzo et al., 1970). Prior to starting fieldwork with human subjects, I
obtained the appropriate approval of my survey instrument from the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Massachusetts Amherst Isenberg School of Management.
Several measures were used to measure each one of the constructs: demographic
characteristics, middle manager’s position within the organization, differences in
environmental perceptions, quality of the relationship between middle manager and top
manager, and strategic role conflict. First, the survey measured individual perceptions of
environmental conditions. Differences in individual perceptions of the environment are
the source of disagreement between levels of management as to what strategic roles are
appropriate to enact. Second, demographic characteristics and characteristics of middle
managers’ positions within the organization were examined. Third, the quality of the
relationship that middle managers have with the top manager to whom their line of
command reports was measured using several indicators. Finally, strategic role conflict
was measured using a modified version of the Rizzo et al.’s (1970) role conflict scale.
Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) was used to test the hypotheses presented in
chapter 3. The ultimate dependent variable was middle manager’s strategic role conflict.
To improve the response rate, I obtained the support of top management for the
study. A letter was sent by the top manager’s administrative assistant via email to all the

60

US-based middle managers of the volunteer divisions mentioning the approval of their
top manager and his/her encouragement to participate in the survey but making clear that
participation was anonymous and voluntary. The middle managers who received the
survey were individuals holding managerial positions higher in the organizational
hierarchy than first-level supervisors and lower than individuals reporting directly to the
CEO (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990; Wooldridge, Schmid, &
Floyd, 2008).
The email contained a link to the electronic version of the questionnaire. The
anonymity of the respondents was assured by not collecting any specific identifying
information such as name of the respondent, social security number, exact date of birth,
or title of the respondent’s position. In addition, I tried to make the survey interesting,
easy to respond, well structured, and the questions relevant and important (Dillman,
2006). I pre-tested the survey with a sample of 25 middle managers to ensure that the
survey questions were adequate and not overly taxing (Dippo, Chun & Sander, 1995).
Two options were offered to complete the survey: an online version of the survey using
Qualtrics and a paper version. The online option allowed respondents to quickly respond
to questions and helped the investigator with data entry. No middle managers requested
to use the paper version of the survey. A similar online survey was administered to the
top managers via electronic means.

4.6 Operationalization of Constructs and Measures
As stated, previously validated scales were used to measure most of the constructs
in the survey. Some adaptations were necessary due to survey instrument constraints and
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the strategic nature of the constructs. The operationalization and measurement of each
construct is explained in this section and summarized in Table 1 in the appendix.
Operationalization of constructs is also illustrated in the structural models shown in
Figures 4.3 and 4.4. The full scales that make up the survey can be found in Table 2 in
the appendix.
In this study, demographic characteristics, middle manager’s position within the
organization, differences in environmental perceptions, and the quality of the middle
manager’ relationship with the top manager were treated as exogenous variables.
Strategic role conflict was endogenous in the models. Since different managers
experience different levels of strategic role conflict, the dependent variable had natural
variability.
4.6.1 Measures for Independent Variables
4.6.1.1 Demographic Characteristics of Middle Managers
Chronological age and years of formal education of the middle manager were the
two demographic characteristics of interest in this dissertation. Their absolute value as
well as their relative value vis-à-vis the top manager to whom the middle manager reports
were measured using single-item scales. Age was obtained by asking respondents to
provide their month and year of birth. Year of formal education was obtained by asking
respondents to provide their total years of formal education counting from the first grade.
4.6.1.2 Nature of Middle Manager’s Position within the Organization
Middle managers’ positions within the organization were characterized as
boundary spanning or non-boundary-spanning. In addition, the number of managerial
layers separating a middle manager from the respective top manager to whom their line
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of command reports was measured to further characterize the nature of the middle
manager’s position within the organization. Finally, the frequency of communication of
the middle manager with the respective top manager to whom his/her line of command
reports was measured to add more nuance to the nature of the middle manager’s position
within the organization. Specific details on the procedures used are given below.
4.6.1.2.1 Boundary Spanning
Middle managers’ boundary spanning activity was measured using a four-item
scale related to contacts outside of their department, their operation, their division, and
their company. This measure was constructed based on items used successfully in prior
research (Keller & Holland, 1975). Keller and Holland’s scale had a reliability of 0.73.
To establish the extent of exposure to outside points of view, respondents were asked to
report on the extent of their interactions outside their department, their operation, their
division, and the company. A reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the items
used for this construct in this dissertation was 0.72, which exceeds the minimum target
reliability of 0.7 for acceptable reliability (Nunnally, 1978). The actual items used are
reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.2.2 Number of managerial layers separating a middle manager from the
respective top manager
The number of managerial layers separating a middle manager from his/her
respective top manager was obtained by asking respondents to provide to the best of their
knowledge the number of layers of management separating their position from the
position of the CEO. Ten percent of the 249 questionnaires that were returned was
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randomly selected and compared against the organizational chart and found accuracy of
about 97%.
4.6.1.2.3 Frequency of communication of the middle manager with the respective
top manager
The frequency of communication of the middle manager with the respective top
manager to whom his/her line of command reports was measured using a three-item scale
related to various ways of communicating adapted from commonly used items examples
of which were obtained from Biddle (1979) and Katz and Kahn (1978). To measure the
extent of visibility to, direct supervision by, and pressure from their top manager,
respondents were asked to report on the extent of their interactions with their top
manager. A reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the items used for this
construct was 0.96, which exceeds the minimum target reliability of 0.7. Since it is
higher than 0.8, it is considered good reliability (Nunnally, 1978). The actual items used
are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.3 Dissimilarity in Environmental Perceptions
The external environment is considered an important aspect that organizations
must contend with (e.g., Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967). Yet, few scales are available for
assessing environmental perceptions. Jaworski and Kohli (1993) developed new scales to
measure perceived market and technological turbulence. The authors created a 6-item
scale to measure perceived market turbulence and a 5-item scale to measure perceived
technological turbulence. Dickson and Weaver (1997) used an environmental perception
scale developed by Covin and Slevin (1989) and Schultz, Slevin, and Covin (1995). The
original scale comprised five items drawn from Miller and Friesen's (1982)
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environmental dynamism measures, five items from Khandwalla's (1977) external
environment measures, and five items developed by Schultz, Slevin, and Covin (1995).
Scale items focus on behavior, and assess environmental perceptions related to general
uncertainty, technological demand and volatility, predictability of markets, and the
potential for future growth and profits. Finally, Joshi and Campbell (2003) used a 4-item
scale to measure perceived environmental dynamism. Their scale items were drawn from
Achrol and Stern (1988). The environmental perceptions items for the present study are
similar to these scales, but were customized more specifically for the strategic nature of
the behaviors studied in this research. For Model B, two types of environmental
perceptions were treated separately: perception of factor markets and perception of
product markets. For Model A, these two dimensions were treated as one construct. .
The specific details of the procedures and the reliability of the scales used are reported in
the subsections below. The actual items used are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.3.1 Environmental perception of product markets
Middle managers’ environmental perception of product markets was measured
using a four-item scale related to predictability of customer preferences and customer
demand adapted from existing scales as explained above (i.e., Covin & Slevin, 1989;
Dickson & Weaver, 1997; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Joshi and Campbell, 2003;
Khandwalla, 1977; Schultz, Slevin & Covin, 1995; and Miller & Friesen, 1982). A
reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the items used for this construct was 0.79.
The actual items used are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
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4.6.1.3.2 Environmental perception of factor markets
Middle managers’ environmental perception of factor markets was measured
using a four-item scale related to predictability and potential of technology in the industry
adapted from existing scales as explained above (i.e., Covin & Slevin, 1989; Dickson &
Weaver, 1997; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Joshi and Campbell, 2003; Khandwalla, 1977;
Schultz, Slevin & Covin, 1995; and Miller & Friesen, 1982). A reliability analysis using
Cronbach’s alpha for the items used for this construct was 0.72. The specific items used
in this study are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.4 Quality of the Middle Manager / Top Manager Relationship
Trust, affect, cognitive flexibility, and integrative bargaining were used as
indicators of the quality of the relationship between the middle manager and the top
manager to whom the middle manager reports. They were measured using existing
measures found in the literature. Whenever existing measures were obtained, I adapted
them for purposes of this dissertation. When no existing scales were obtained, I created
new survey items to use as indicators. The specific details of the procedures and the
reliability of the scales used are reported in the subsections below. The actual items used
are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.4.1 Trust
The definition of trust used in this dissertation is taken from Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman (1995). According to these authors, mutual trust is the degree to which one
party has the willingness to be vulnerable to another party’s actions based on the
expectation that the other party (i.e., the trustee) will perform a particular action
important to the one party (i.e., the trustor), irrespective of the one party’s ability to
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monitor or control the behavior of the other party. There are a number of scales that
measure trust in interpersonal relations, especially trust in people in general, or trust in
social groups, or trust in social institutions (e.g., Wrightsman, 1964; Rosenberg, 1957;
Rotter, 1967; Shure & Meeker, 1967). However, there are few scales that measure
interpersonal trust within organizations. Cook and Wall (1980) developed an original 12item scale to measure interpersonal trust at work. The trust items for the present study
were adapted from Cook and Wall’s (1980) scale and customized more specifically for
the strategic nature of the behaviors studied in this research. A reliability analysis using
Cronbach’s alpha for the four-item scale used to measure this construct was 0.85. Since
it is higher than 0.8, it is considered good reliability (Nunnally, 1978). An additional
measure of trust measured the discrepancy rather than the summation of the perceptions
of mutual trust between the middle manager and the top manager. The actual items used
are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.4.2 Affect
Affect is positive feelings of one party toward another party (i.e., “liking” the
other person) that predispose the one party to be more receptive to persuasive
communication from the other party. It involves special regard of one party for another
party’s judgment, competence, talents, and skills that translates into paying attention to
and taking seriously the opinions of the other party. To measure affective bond, four
items were adapted from the affective bond scale by Kahn et al. (1964) and Tsui’s (1983)
scale. The measure consists of three components: admiration, respect, and liking. A
reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the four-item scale used to measure this
construct was 0.90. Since it is higher than 0.8, it is considered good reliability (Nunnally,
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1978). An additional measure of affect measured the discrepancy rather than the
summation of the perceptions of mutual affect between the middle manager and the top
manager. The actual items used are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
4.6.1.4.3 Cognitive Flexibility
As defined earlier, cognitive flexibility is the extent to which the information
exchange process between top managers and middle managers is characterized by
reflection, objective information review, use of different perspectives, being open to
hearing from the other party, having the capacity and willingness to change one’s
opinion, and developing a large variety of interpretations (Raes et al., 2011). Martin and
Rubin (1995) developed a 12-item scale to measure cognitive flexibility and validated it
in two separate studies involving a total of 522 participants. The authors’ analysis
demonstrated that their cognitive flexibility scale was internally reliable and had
construct and concurrent validity. The specific items to measure cognitive flexibility in
the present study were adapted from Martin and Rubin’s (1995) scale to more specifically
address the strategic nature of the behaviors studied in this research. The actual items
used are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
A reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the four-item scale used to
measure this cognitive flexibility was 0.90. Since it is higher than 0.8, it is considered
good reliability (Nunnally, 1978). An additional measure of cognitive flexibility
measured the discrepancy rather than the summation of the perceptions of mutual
cognitive flexibility between the middle manager and the top manager.
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4.6.1.4.4 Integrative Bargaining
Integrative bargaining is the degree to which top managers and middle managers
try to find common or complementary interests that benefit both parties rather than just
one party during their mutual influencing process (Raes et al., 2011). It is based on the
idea that a negotiation is not a zero-sum game, but that benefits can be found that
increase both parties’ welfare. Parties can discover solutions that meet one party’s needs
at little cost to the other party when the parties convey their true interests to each other
and if they remain engaged with each other exploring options (Fisher, Ury, & Patton,
1991). Effective integrative bargaining requires persistence and effort and concern for
the other side’s interest as well as for one’s own interest (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). There
are no known scales to measure integrative bargaining as in past literature it has been
measured by observation. Therefore, I created new items based on Raes et al.’s (2011)
description and definition of integrative bargaining. The new scale was pre-tested in the
pre-test, and weaker items were removed to increase its internal reliability. The actual
items used are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
A reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the five-item scale used to
measure this integrative bargaining was 0.89. Since it is higher than 0.8, it is considered
good reliability (Nunnally, 1978). An additional measure of integrative bargaining
measured the discrepancy rather than the summation of the perceptions of mutual
integrative bargaining between the middle manager and the top manager.
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4.6.2 Measures for Dependent Variable
4.6.2.1 Strategic Role Conflict
The strategic role conflict that I am interested in is the one subjectively
experienced by managers as tension and discomfort when faced with conflicting
expectations for their strategic behavior. Traditionally, the literature identifies two ways
used in the past to measure role conflict, one objective and one subjective. The objective
measure assesses the level of role conflict from the existence of conditions likely to lead
to the occurrence of role conflict. For example, the existence of role conflict can be
inferred from the degree of incompatibility of role expectations between the expectations
sent toward the role incumbent by the role senders (Kahn et al., 1964). However, the
objective measure does not really capture or predict the experience of role conflict. It
only identifies the conditions that can lead to the experience of role conflict. On the other
hand, the subjective measure attempts to gauge the degree of role conflict experience by
the role incumbent. I believe that role conflict is mainly associated with the perception
and subjective experience of the role incumbent. As a result, a subjective measure is
more appropriate because it measures the actual psychological state of the individual
experiencing the role conflict. It is the psychological state of internal discomfort of the
individual that interferes with the appropriateness and effectiveness of the individual’s
decisions and actions; and for this reason, it is the phenomenon of study in this
dissertation.
To measure strategic role conflict, I used a modified measure adapted from items
originally developed by Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman (1970). The authors developed a
questionnaire consisting of two independent scales designed to measure role conflict and

70

role ambiguity in complex organizations. Rizzo et al. (1970) used their new
questionnaire to identify barriers for the effective implementation of a management
development program in a large manufacturing company. The original items from Rizzo
et al.’s (1970) role conflict scale were modified for purposes of this research, and after a
pre-test, a six-item scale was created. Each item in the role conflict scale was measured
on 7-point Likert-type scale using an agree-disagree response format. The items were
combined by summation into a single construct. A 7-point Likert-type format ( 1 =
"strongly agree," . . ., 7 = "strongly disagree") was used to anchor all of the items in this
scale. The actual items used in this study are reported on Table 2 in the appendix.
A reliability analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for the six-item scale used to
measure strategic role conflict was 0.89. It is considered good reliability since it is higher
than the rule of thumb 0.8 for good reliability (Nunnally, 1978) and compares favorably
with a similarly-derived, eleven-item measure used by Rogers and Molnar (1976) in a
study of top administrators in 110 county offices of federal, state, and county agencies,
which had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82.

4.6.3 Threats to Validity
The validity of the study results depends on having an unbiased sample of the
total research population. In the present study, two potential sources of sampling bias
merit attention. The first source of bias derives from the methods used in the data
collection process. Common method bias can distort the results in studies that measure
variables as subjective perceptions of the respondents and collect data for the dependent
variable at the same time as data for the independent variables. The second source of
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bias is the possibility that the respondent middle managers are systematically different in
the primary study variables from the research population as a whole. Even if the
sampling procedure is ideally random, such differences may exist if certain classes of
individuals (for example, based on their position within the organization, years with the
company) are more likely to respond than others.
4.6.3.1 Common Method Bias
As stated above, studies that measure variables as subjective perceptions of the
respondents and collect data for the dependent variable at the same time as data for the
independent variables have the potential that common method bias influences the results.
Extant research mentions four main sources of common method bias: (1) the use of a
common respondent, (2) how items are presented in the questionnaire, (3) the context
surrounding items in the survey, and (4) when, where, and how the constructs are
measured (Podsakoff et al, 2003).
The present study had a lesser potential for common method bias because most
independent variables were measured as combinations of responses given by middle
managers and responses given by their top manager. On the other hand, the dependent
variable was measured exclusively via middle managers’ responses. Nevertheless, I used
several techniques during the design and data collection stages of my study to further
reduce the potential for common method bias. First, all communication directed to the
respondents, as well as the survey instrument, avoided any explicit mention of the
purpose of the study or the dependent variable. This was done to reduce pre-conception
bias by preventing respondents from anticipating the relationships under study. Second,
the order and location of the survey items were also intentionally designed to help reduce
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pre-conception bias. To further prevent other answering biases, respondents were
assured of the voluntary and anonymous nature of their responses, and language that
could give any indication of the purpose of the research was avoided (Podsakoff et al,
2003). Finally, Harman’s single-factor test showed post hoc that common method bias
was not a problem because neither a single factor nor one general factor accounted for
more than 15% the variance in the data (e.g., Aulakh & Gencturk, 2000; Christmann,
2004; Lederer et al, 2000).
4.6.3.2 Non-response Bias
To reduce nonresponse bias, I thoroughly pre-tested my survey. I paid particular
attention that my survey ran smoothly online, that loading times were not long, that
questions fitted properly on the screen, and that the more sensitive questions regarding
personal information where asked last. I avoided rushes by giving respondents a long
data collection period so that participants could choose any day during the data collection
period to respond according to their own busy schedule, and reminders were sent via
email a week after and two weeks after the initial invitation to participate. Finally,
respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality by not asking for any
personally identifiable information and assuring respondents that the information they
provide would be aggregated as part the whole sample and not individually scrutinized
(Kline, 2010). To test for the presence of non-response bias, the study sample was
compared to the total survey population on the basis of percent of respondents at each
managerial level. The comparison revealed that for each managerial level, the proportion
of respondents to non-respondents was similar. Although not a statistical test, the results
give me confidence that non-response bias is not an issue in this study.
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4.7 Method of Statistical Analysis
The models that I am testing were conceptualized a priori based on theory.
Therefore, the appropriate statistical methodology to test them is Structural Equations
Modeling (SEM). SEM examines the adequacy of the overall model, the paths between
the constructs, and the overall explanatory power of the model measured as the percent of
variability in the dependent variable explained by the model (Kline, 2010).
According to Kline (2010), there are six basic steps to follow when conducting
Structural Equations Modeling. The first step is to specify the model, which was done in
the preceding section. The second step is to determine if the model is identified. A
model is said to be identified if there is no reciprocal causation between endogenous
variables, if there are no feedback loops, and if the endogenous variables are otherwise
unrelated (i.e., if the model is recursive; Kline, 2010). Based on the theory used to
generate the model, all three of these restrictions have been met. Therefore, the models
as presented are identified. The third step requires specifying the measures to be used
(i.e., operationalizing the constructs) and collecting, preparing, and screening the data.
All the data was reviewed and assessed for face validity and integrity. A visual check of
the data and descriptive statistics revealed no obvious entry mistakes, incorrect reverse
coding, or invalid responses. Descriptive statistics included mean, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis for each survey item. These are presented in Table 4.1.
Skewness and kurtosis were within normal range. In the following section, Kline’s
(2010) step four Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted to confirm the
unidimensionality of the constructs.
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4.7.1 Measurement Models – Confirmatory Factor Analysis
In addition to the alpha coefficients that I used to examine the validity of the
scales, I conducted Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA’s) to further establish the
validity of the constructs. I conducted CFA’s for both measurement models using
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and the software package MPlus. As stated earlier,
SEM examines the adequacy of the overall model, the paths between the constructs (i.e.,
the individual relationships between variables), and the general effectiveness of the
measurement model (Kline, 2005; Hair, et al, 2009).
Traditional validity tests use coefficient alpha to measure reliability. However,
coefficient alpha has some limitations. One limitation is that coefficient alpha assumes
that all items contribute equally to reliability, which is usually not the case (Bollen, 1989;
Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004). SEM provides a better method because
composite reliability can be inferred by examining the standardized factor loadings of
each item on the construct they purportedly measure and comparing these standardized
factor loadings to the correlations between the construct and other constructs. Large
standardized factor loadings are evidence of convergent validity. Correlation coefficients
between each latent variable that are less than the standardized factor loadings are
evidence of discriminant validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Gerbing & Anderson,
1988; Kline, 2010; Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004; Stevens, 1996)
The first step of the CFA is to assess the overall fit of the measurement model. If
the CFA shows a reasonable fit to the data, the first evidence of convergent validity of the
constructs has been found. SEM tests fit by examining how well the proposed model
reproduces the actual covariance matrix. Several fit statistics are used to evaluate how
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different the model-predicted covariance matrix is from the actual covariance matrix
derived from the data (Hair et al, 2009). Goodness of fit is assessed looking at several fit
statistics which include: Normed Chi-square fit statistic (χ2/Df), Comparative Fit
Indicator (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Non-Normed Fit
Index (NNFI) also known as Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual (SRMR). As shown below, I used traditional rules of thumb to assess
the various fit statistics to decide if a model provided reasonable fit (e.g., Bentler and
Bonnet, 1980; Hair et al, 2009; Hooper, Coughlan, and Mullen, 2008; Klein, 2005;
Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004; Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977).
For Model A’s measurement model, the normed χ2 is 2.40, which is below the
recommended cut off level of three indicating good fit. The Comparative Fit Indicator
(CFI) of 0.770 suggests poor fit as it is below the recommended cut off of 0.90 for
reasonable fit. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is 0.083, below
the 0.10 recommended cut off suggesting good fit. The RMSEA 90% confidence interval
is from 0.078 to 0.087. It also suggests good fit as it below the recommended cut off of
0.10. The Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) also known as the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is
0.752 suggesting poor fit as it is below the recommended cut off of 0.90 for reasonable
fit. Finally, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) of 0.097 is greater
than 0.08, also suggesting poor fit. Taken together, the overall conclusion is that Model
A’s measurement model does not provide a reasonable fit to the data and barely an
acceptable fit. Continuing, the CFA shows that each item factor loading loaded onto the
construct it was supposed to measure with a statistically significant t-test (p<0.05) and
that all the standardized factor loadings were large enough providing more evidence of
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convergent validity. Finally, the correlation coefficients between each of the constructs
are smaller than the standardized factor loadings of the items used to measure the
constructs, which provides evidence of discriminant validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988;
Kline, 2010; Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004; Stevens, 1996). Since Model A’s
measurement model barely provides an acceptable fit to the data, I now proceed to
examine Model B’s measurement model.
For Model B’s measurement model, the normed χ2 is 1.82, which is below the
recommended cut off of three indicating good fit. The Comparative Fit Indicator (CFI)
of 0.893 suggests acceptable fit as it is almost the recommended cut off of 0.90 for
reasonable fit. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is 0.057, below
the 0.10 recommended cut off suggesting good fit. The RMSEA 90% confidence interval
is from 0.052 to 0.062. It also suggests good fit as it below the recommended cut off of
0.10. The Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) also known as the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is
0.881 suggesting acceptable fit as it is slightly below the recommended cut off of 0.90 for
reasonable fit. Finally, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) of 0.086 is
greater than 0.08, suggesting less than reasonable fit. Taken together, the overall
conclusion is that the Model B’s measurement model provides a reasonable fit to the
data. The next step is to examine the individual factor loadings between the constructs
and their associated measurement items for statistical significance. The CFA shows that
each item factor loading loaded onto the construct it was supposed to measure with a
statistically significant t-test (p<0.05). Finally, all the standardized factor loadings were
large providing further evidence of convergent validity. The last step is to compare the
correlation coefficients between each of the constructs to make sure that they are smaller
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than the standardized factor loadings of the items used to measure the constructs. In all
cases, the correlation coefficients between all the constructs are smaller than the
standardized factor loadings of the items. This is evidence of discriminant validity
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Kline, 2010; Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004;
Stevens, 1996). In summary, Model B’s measurement model provides reasonable fit to
the data, has construct validity, and discriminant validity. Therefore, it can be used for
testing the hypotheses of this dissertation.

4.7.2 Structural Models
Once the construct scales were set and unidimensionality determined, two
structural models were tested (see figures 4.3 and 4.4 for the structural models A and B
and table 5.1 for a summary of model fit). Model B was conceptualized as an alternative
to Model A (Kline’s, 2010 step 5). In the next chapter, path loadings connecting each
independent variable to the dependent variable for the best fitting model are reported in
table 5.4 and graphically in figure 5.1 (Kline’s, 2010 step 6). The meanings of the
constructs, variables, and indicators are shown in Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix.

78

Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum Maximum Mean

Statistic Statistic

Std. Deviation

Statistic Statistic

Statistic

Skewness

Kurtosis

Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error

Age

232

29

58

41.47

6.29

0.13

0.16

-0.62

0.32

YrsEdu

232

11

22

16.03

1.64

-0.15

0.16

2.37

0.32

Layers

249

2

5

3.91

0.87

-0.43

0.15

-0.49

0.31

IntDep

249

2

7

5.46

1.30

-0.65

0.15

-0.14

0.31

IntOp

249

1

7

4.45

1.38

-0.18

0.15

-0.06

0.31

IntDiv

249

1

7

3.51

1.25

0.16

0.15

0.00

0.31

IntOut

249

1

7

3.68

1.72

0.39

0.15

-0.71

0.31

PrefChg

249

0

3

1.76

0.95

-0.25

0.15

-0.90

0.31

CustDem

249

0

3

1.84

1.02

-0.34

0.15

-1.06

0.31

PrefPre

249

0

4

2.57

1.14

-0.50

0.15

-0.47

0.31

DemFor

249

0

3

1.57

0.99

-0.03

0.15

-1.02

0.31

TechChg

249

0

4

2.79

1.24

-0.59

0.15

-0.86

0.31

BigOpps

249

0

3

1.90

1.06

-0.42

0.15

-1.14

0.31

DiffFor

249

0

3

2.09

1.04

-0.76

0.15

-0.72

0.31

NewIdeas

249

0

3

2.02

1.01

-0.64

0.15

-0.77

0.31

Sincere

247

6

12

8.90

1.27

-0.26

0.15

-0.39

0.31

Trust1

247

6

12

9.16

1.43

-0.05

0.15

-0.47

0.31

Effectiv

247

5

11

7.93

1.30

0.31

0.15

-0.32

0.31

TreatMe

247

5

11

7.69

1.40

0.18

0.15

-0.30

0.31

TrustD

247

0.00

3.50

0.98

0.79

0.93

0.15

0.33

0.31

Helpful

247

6

12

9.20

1.63

0.03

0.15

-0.64

0.31

Admire

247

5

11

8.40

1.32

0.00

0.15

-0.47

0.31

Respect

247

5

11

8.34

1.74

-0.17

0.15

-0.93

0.31

Like

247

6

12

9.75

1.62

-0.39

0.15

-0.56

0.31

AffectD

247

0.00

3.50

1.16

0.76

0.50

0.15

-0.25

0.31

Workable

247

6

12

9.47

1.46

0.07

0.15

-0.73

0.31

Creative

247

5

11

8.69

1.30

-0.36

0.15

-0.04

0.31

Consider

246

6

12

9.63

1.35

-0.34

0.16

-0.16

0.31

TryDiff

246

5

11

8.01

1.34

0.06

0.16

-0.60

0.31

CogFlexD

246

0.00

3.50

0.98

0.69

0.72

0.16

0.43

0.31

Collabor

246

6

12

10.09

1.62

-0.60

0.16

-0.39

0.31

Finding

246

6

12

10.45

1.60

-0.94

0.16

0.21

0.31

Oriented

246

5

11

9.28

1.56

-0.68

0.16

-0.25

0.31

Coopera

246

6

12

10.22

1.50

-0.46

0.16

-0.69

0.31

WinWin

246

6

12

9.93

1.58

-0.45

0.16

-0.56

0.31

IntBargD

246

0.00

3.80

1.16

0.72

0.45

0.16

-0.08

0.31

OftComm

239

1

7

3.62

1.72

0.28

0.16

-0.70

0.31

OftTalk

239

1

7

3.09

1.71

0.68

0.16

-0.30

0.31

OftEmail

239

1

7

3.33

1.74

0.34

0.16

-0.66

0.31

Z1

232

1

7

3.15

1.73

0.70

0.16

-0.41

0.32

Z2

232

1

7

3.14

1.80

0.77

0.16

-0.43

0.32

Z3

232

1

7

4.56

1.32

-0.01

0.16

-0.54

0.32

Z4

232

1

7

5.76

1.38

-1.54

0.16

2.18

0.32

Z5

232

1

7

5.84

1.30

-1.60

0.16

2.63

0.32

Z6

232

1

7

4.58

1.42

-0.42

0.16

-0.12

0.32

Valid N (listwise)

232

|sk|<2 Satisfied
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|ku|<7 Satisfied

Table 4.2: Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations

Variable
Age
AgeD

Mean

Std.
Dev.

41.466

6.288

Age

AgeD

Yrs
Edu

Yrs
EduD

Bound
Spa

Layers

Freq
Comm

Prod
Mkt

Factr
Mkt

Trust

TrustD

Affect

AffectD

9.819

5.832

-.960

16.034

1.638

.048

-.076

YrsEduD

2.095

1.468

-.057

.085

-.819

BoundSpa

4.272

1.052

-.174

.158

-.072

-.032

Layers

3.912

.866

-.612

.571

-.160

.135

.250

FreqComm

3.353

1.652

.447

-.403

.097

-.085

-.123

-.768

ProdMkt

1.774

.840

-.304

.269

.020

-.015

.290

.376

-.327

FactrMkt

1.832

.854

-.180

.161

-.060

.095

.165

.203

-.174

.320

Trust

8.418

1.119

.169

-.160

.147

-.142

.072

-.248

.199

-.017

.072

TrustD

.979

.794

-.188

.151

-.037

.011

.016

.259

-.155

.140

-.023

-.597

Affect

8.921

1.388

.095

-.089

.018

-.060

.048

-.109

.079

.079

.043

.479

-.235

AffectD

1.160

.764

.039

-.019

.045

-.010

-.065

-.037

.055

-.039

-.080

.002

.122

-.183

CogFlex

8.945

1.194

.035

-.050

.082

-.084

-.058

-.138

.097

.040

.021

.013

-.062

.025

.056

YrsEdu

CogFlexD

Cog
Flex

Cog
FlexD

Int
Barg

.976

.687

-.090

.070

.076

-.031

-.022

.139

-.134

.016

.056

.014

.023

-.030

.016

-.186

IntBarg

9.993

1.312

.079

-.056

.115

-.075

-.049

-.138

.121

.022

.039

.031

-.021

.076

.059

.513

-.166

IntBargD

1.164

.719

.013

.023

.016

-.016

.019

-.018

-.015

.034

.036

.046

.071

.101

.065

.006

.160

.042

StrRConf

4.504

1.206

-.051

.064

-.050

.073

.273

-.087

.177

.300

.335

-.003

-.009

-.032

.061

-.037

.004

.003

*Note: Correlations > .134 are significant at the p < .05 level
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Figure 4.3
Strategic Role Conflict – Structural Model A
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Figure 4.4
Strategic Role Conflict – Structural Model B
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the results of empirical tests of structural models A and B
presented in chapter 4 and of the hypotheses offered in Chapter 3. Descriptive statistics
for the measures were shown in Chapter 4 so they will not be repeated here. A discussion
of the findings will be undertaken in Chapter 6.
5.2 Results of the Structural Models
A cross-sectional field study was used to relate differences in the amount of
strategic role conflict experienced by middle managers with its antecedents at a specific
point in time. Informants were asked to report on their specific experiences. Two
structural models (Model A and Model B) were tested. Results are presented in table 5.1.
5.2.1 Structural Model A
Model A (the more parsimonious) used twelve exogenous variables as predictors
of the endogenous variable (see figure 4.1). Evaluation of several important fit indices is
contradictory suggesting that Model A does not provide a reasonable fit to the data (see
table 5.1). The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is 0.078, below the
0.10 recommended cutoff suggesting reasonable fit. The RMSEA 90% confidence
interval is from 0.074 to 082 also suggesting reasonable fit as it is below the 0.10
recommended cutoff. However, the CFI is 0.769 and NNFI (TLI) is 0.743 indicating
poor fit as they are well below the recommended cutoff of 0.90. The SRMR at 0.069
suggests acceptable fit as it is below the 0.08 cutoff. Taken together, these indices
suggest that Model A does not provide a reasonable fit to the data.
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5.2.2 Structural Model B
Model B (the less parsimonious) used fifteen exogenous variables as predictors of
the endogenous variable (see figure 4.2). Evaluation of several important fit indices
reveals that Model B provides reasonable fit to the data (see table 5.1). The Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is 0.051, below the 0.10 recommended cutoff.
The RMSEA 90% confidence interval is from 0.046 to 0.056. It suggests reasonable fit
as it below the recommended cut off of 0.10 (Hair et al, 2009). The CFI is 0.904 and
NNFI (TLI) is 0.889 suggesting acceptable fit as they are slightly above and slightly
below the cutoff of 0.90 for reasonable fit. The SRMR of 0.052, smaller than 0.08, also
suggests reasonable fit. Taken together, the fit indices indicate that Model B provides a
reasonable fit to the data.
Table 5.1: Strategic Role Conflict Models A and B Goodness of Fit Evaluation
Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation

Model

Minimum
2
Fit χ

Df

2

χ /Df
2.50

RMSEA
0.078

90% Confidence
Interval
{0.074; 0.082}

CFI
0.769

NNFI
(TLI)
0.743

2188.423
p = 0.000* 874 s/b < 3 s/b < 0.10 Upper Limit s/b < 0.10 s/b > 0.90 s/b > 0.90
1374.334
1.65
0.051
{0.046; 0.056}
0.904
0.889
B
p = 0.000* 832 s/b < 3 s/b < 0.10 Upper Limit s/b < 0.10 s/b > 0.90 s/b > 0.90
H0: The model fits the data perfectly.
* At α = 0.05, we can reject the null. As expected, the model does not fit the data
2
perfectly. However, the normed χ is below the cutoff of 2 indicating reasonable fit.
A

5.2.3 Comparison of Model A versus Model B
Table 5.2 shows a comparison of Model A versus Model B. A delta Chi-square
test was used to objectively compare both models. A delta Chi-square of 814.089 with
42 degrees of freedom has a p-value of 0.000, which is statistically significant and
indicates that Model A does not provide a better fit of the data than Model B. Finally, a
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SRMR
0.069
s/b < 0.08

0.052
s/b < 0.08

delta CFI test can tell us if the worsening of the fit is relevant for practical purposes.
Since the delta CFI is greater than 0.01, we can conclude that the worse fit of Model A is
not only statistically significant but also for practical purposes Model A provides a worse
fit to the data than Model B.
Table 5.2: Strategic Role Conflict Models A and B Comparison
2

Model

Minimum Fit χ

A

2188.423

(more parsimonious)

p = 0.000

2

df

Δ df

Δχ *

Δ CFI

874
2188.423 - 1374.334 =

B**

874 - 832 =
0.904 - 0.769 =
814.089
832
42
0.135
(less parsimonious)
p = 0.000
p = 0.000 Reject H0
*Represents change in χ2 from the immediately prior model.
H0: The more parsimonious model provides a better fit than the less parsimonious
model.
**Best model. At α = 0.05, we can reject the null. The more parsimonious model
does not provide better fit than the less parsimonious model. Actually, the
more parsimonious provides worse fit.

1374.334

5.2.4 Total Variance in Strategic Role conflict Explained by Model B
As table 5.3 below shows, Model B explained 36.4% of the observed variance in
strategic role conflict.
Table 5.3: Strategic Role Conflict Percent Variance Explained by Model B
R-SQUARE
Latent Variable
Strategic Role Conflict

R-Square
Estimate

S.E.

Est./S.E.

Two-Tailed
P-Value

0.364

0.064

5.446

0.000
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5.3 Tests of Hypotheses
In the section below, the hypotheses presented in chapter 3 will be tested against
the results of Model B. Table 5.4 summarizes these results at the conclusion of the
chapter.
5.3.1 Hypotheses Regarding Demographic Characteristics of Middle Managers
The first set of hypotheses was designed to analyze the relationship between a
middle manager’s demographic characteristics and their influence on middle manager’s
strategic role conflict. In hypotheses 1a and 1b, I suggested that the chronological age of
the middle manager and the difference in age between the middle manager and the top
manager would be associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict. In hypotheses
1c and 1d, I suggested that the middle manager’s years of formal education and the
difference in years of formal education between the middle manager and the top manager
would also be associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict.
Hypothesis 1a (middle manager’s age) was not supported. The parameter sign
was in the hypothesized direction, but it was not significant (γ = -0.017, p = 0.277). To
test hypothesis 1b, the middle manager’s age was replaced with the difference between
the middle manager’s age and the top manager’s age. Hypothesis 1b (age difference) was
also not supported. The parameter sign was in the hypothesized direction, but it was not
significant (γ = 0.021, p = 0.174).
Hypothesis 1c (middle manager’s years of formal education) was not supported.
Hypothesis 1c’s parameter estimate was in the hypothesized direction, but it was not
significant (γ = -0.031, p = 0.535). To test hypothesis 1d, the middle manager’s years of
formal education was replaced with the difference between the middle manager’s years of

86

formal education and the top manager’s years of formal education. Hypothesis 1d’s
parameter estimate was also in the hypothesized direction, but it was not significant (γ =
0.056, p = 0. 305). Thus, none of the demographic hypotheses were supported.
5.3.2 Hypotheses Regarding the Nature of Middle Manager’s Position within the
Organization
The second set of hypotheses was designed to analyze the relationship between
the nature of the middle manager’s position within the organization and their influence on
middle manager’s strategic role conflict. Data were collected on three types of
characteristics: boundary-spanning activity, layers of management separating the middle
manager from the top manager, and frequency of communication between the middle
manager and the top manager. In hypothesis 2a, I suggested that the amount of
boundary-spanning activity of the middle manager would be associated with higher levels
of strategic role conflict. In hypothesis 2b, I suggested that middle managers higher in
the organizational chart would experience higher levels of strategic role conflict. Finally,
in hypothesis 2c, I suggested that the frequency of a middle manager’s communication
with the top manager would also be associated with higher levels of strategic role
conflict.
Hypothesis 2a (boundary spanning) was supported. Its parameter sign was in the
hypothesized direction and was statistically significant (γ = 0.323, p = 0.001).
Hypothesis 2b (layers of management) was only marginally supported (γ = -0.318, p =
0.07). Its parameter was in the hypothesized direction, which means that as middle
managers are closer in the organizational chart, they experience more strategic role
conflict. However, this result was not statistically significant at the p≤0.05 level.
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Finally, hypothesis 2c (frequency of communication) was supported. Its parameter
estimate was in the hypothesized direction and was statistically significant (γ = 0.231, p =
0.006). This means that middle managers with higher boundary-spanning activity
experience higher levels of strategic role conflict than their counterparts with lower levels
of boundary-spanning activity. Similarly, middle managers who communicate more
frequently with their top manager experience higher levels of strategic role conflict than
their counterparts who communicate less frequently with their top manager.
5.3.3 Hypothesis Regarding Differences in Environmental Perceptions
The third set of hypotheses was designed to analyze the relationship between
differences in the environmental perceptions of the middle manager versus the top
manager’s and their impact on middle manager’s strategic role conflict. Data were
collected on two types of environmental perceptions: product markets and factor markets.
In hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, I suggested that the discrepancy of the middle manager’s
environmental perceptions versus the top manager’s environmental perceptions would be
associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict.
Hypotheses 3.1 (environmental perception of the product markets) and 3.2
(environmental perception of the factor markets) were both supported. Their parameters
signs were both in the hypothesized direction and statistically significant (γ = 0.533, p =
0.007; γ = 0.383, p = 0.001). This means that middle managers who have increasingly
different environmental perceptions than those of their top manager experience higher
levels of strategic role conflict.
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5.3.4 Hypothesis Regarding the Quality of the Relationship Middle Manager / Top
Manager
The fourth set of hypotheses was designed to analyze the quality of the
relationship between middle managers and their top manager and its impact on middle
manager’s strategic role conflict. Data were collected on four dimensions of relationship
quality: trust, affect, cognitive flexibility, and integrative bargaining. In hypothesis 4.1, I
suggested that higher joint trust would be associated with lower levels of strategic role
conflict. In hypothesis 4.2, I suggested that higher discrepancy in mutual trust would be
associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict. In hypothesis 4.3, I suggested
higher joint affect would be associated with lower levels of strategic role conflict. In
hypothesis 4.4, I suggested that higher discrepancy in mutual affect would be associated
with higher levels of strategic role conflict. In hypothesis 4.5, I suggested that higher
cognitive flexibility would be associated with lower levels of strategic role conflict. In
hypothesis 4.6, I suggested that higher discrepancy in cognitive flexibility would be
associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict. Lastly, in hypotheses 4.7 I
suggested that higher integrative bargaining would be associated with lower levels of
strategic role conflict and in hypothesis 4.8 that higher discrepancy in cognitive
flexibility would be associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict.
Hypotheses 4.1 (joint trust) was supported. Its parameter was in the hypothesized
direction and was statistically significant (γ = -0.399, p = 0.052). Hypotheses 4.2 (trust
discrepancy) was not supported. Its parameter estimate was in the opposite direction as
hypothesized and was not statistically significant (γ = -0.204, p = 0.177). Hypothesis 4.3
(joint affect) was not supported. The parameter sign was not in the hypothesized
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direction, and it was also not significant (γ = 0.012, p = 0.89). Hypothesis 4.4 (affect
discrepancy) was supported. Its parameter was in the hypothesized direction and was
statistically significant (γ = 0.214, p = 0.048). Hypotheses 4.5 (cognitive flexibility) and
4.6 (cognitive flexibility discrepancy) were not supported. Their parameter estimates
were in the opposite direction as hypothesized and were not statistically significant (γ = 0.114, p = 0.168; γ = 0.130, p = 0.264). Hypotheses 4.7 (integrative bargaining) and 4.8
(integrative bargaining discrepancy) were also not supported. The parameter signs were
in the hypothesized direction but were not significant (γ = 0.034, p = 0.679; γ = -0.077, p
= 0.474).
A summary of findings is presented in table 5.4 and a graphic depiction is seen in
figure 5.1.
Table 5.4: Strategic Role Conflict Parameter Estimates
γ
Hypotheses

Estimates

S.E.

Est./S.E.

Two-Tailed
P-Value

Results

1a

Age

-0.017

0.015

-1.088

0.277

Not supported

1b
1c
1d
2a
2b
2c
3.1
3.2
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8

Age Difference
Years of Education
Difference in Years of Education
Boundary Spanning
Layers of Management
Frequency of Communication
Perception of Product Markets
Perception of Factor Markets
Joint Trust
Trust Discrepancy
Joint Affect
Affect Discrepancy
Cognitive Flexibility
Cognitive Flexibility Discrepancy
Integrative Bargaining
Integrative Bargaining Discrepancy

0.021
-0.031
0.056
0.323
-0.318
0.231
0.533
0.383
-0.399
-0.204
0.012
0.214
-0.114
0.130
0.034
-0.077

0.016
0.049
0.054
0.101
0.176
0.085
0.199
0.115
0.205
0.151
0.086
0.108
0.083
0.116
0.082
0.108

1.360
-0.620
1.027
3.198
-1.811
2.726
2.681
3.319
-1.943
-1.350
0.139
1.980
-1.378
1.118
0.414
-0.716

0.174
0.535
0.305
0.001
0.070
0.006
0.007
0.001
0.052
0.177
0.890
0.048
0.168
0.264
0.679
0.474

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Marginal support
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
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Figure 5.1
Strategic Role Conflict – Model B Parameter Estimates
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
6.1 Discussion
Middle managers influence organizational strategy through their four strategic
roles of championing alternatives, facilitating adaptability, synthesizing information, and
implementing deliberate strategy. It has been established that strategic middle managers
are important to organizational outcomes (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1996; Wooldridge
& Floyd, 1990; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000). Floyd and Lane (2000) identified the
phenomenon of strategic role conflict and argued the importance of understanding it
because of its potential for undermining strategic organizational efforts. This dissertation
explored the antecedents of middle managers’ strategic role conflict in two divisions of a
large organization to shed light on their connection to strategic role conflict. The broad
research question that I set out to examine in this dissertation was: what are the
antecedents of strategic role conflict? To address this question, seventeen hypotheses
were proposed in chapter 3. Five of the hypotheses were fully supported (see Table 6.1).
The results show a clear linkage between the presence of certain antecedents and the
experience of strategic role conflict by middle managers. Thus, these findings have
significant theoretical and practical implications that will be reviewed in the following
sections. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this
study and suggest avenues for future research.
6.1.1 Research Findings
Differences in perceptions of product and factor markets between middle manager
and top manager were found positively related to middle manager’s strategic role
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conflict. Stated differently, the more the environmental perceptions of the middle
manager differed from the environmental perceptions of the top manager to whom the
middle manager reported, the greater the strategic role conflict that the middle manager
experienced. In addition, the more that the middle manager’s position within the
organization caused him/her to engage in boundary spanning activities, the greater the
strategic role conflict that the middle manager experienced. Furthermore, the more that
the middle manager communicated with his/her top manager, the greater the strategic role
conflict that the middle manager experienced. Conversely, the more trust that the middle
manager and his/her top manager had in each other, the less the strategic role conflict that
the middle manager experienced. Finally, the greater the discrepancy in the amount of
affect that the middle manager and the top manager had for each other, the greater the
strategic role conflict that the middle manager experienced.
Table 6.1: Summary of Support for the Hypotheses

Hypothesis

Relationship Tested

Support

1a

Middle Manager’s Age (-)

Not supported

1b
1c
1d
2a
2b
2c
3.1
3.2
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8

Age Difference between Middle and Top Managers (+)
Middle Manager’s Years of Education (-)
Difference in Years of Education between Middle and Top Managers (+)
Middle Manager’s Amount of Boundary Spanning (+)
Layers of Management Separating Middle and Top Managers (-)
Frequency of Communication with Top Management (+)
Difference in Perception of Product Markets (+)
Difference in Perception of Factor Markets (+)
Trust between Middle and Top Managers (-)
Trust Discrepancy (+)
Affect between Middle and Top Managers (-)
Affect Discrepancy (+)
Cognitive Flexibility between Middle and Top Managers (-)
Cognitive Flexibility Discrepancy (+)
Integrative Bargaining between Middle and Top Managers (-)
Integrative Bargaining Discrepancy (+)

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Marginally supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
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6.1.2 Discussion of results about the relationship between demographic
characteristics of middle managers and strategic role conflict
In hypothesis 1a, I suggested that the chronological age of a middle manager
would be negatively associated with strategic role conflict. The rationale for this
hypothesis was based on extant research that established a connection between
personality traits and role conflict. An important dimension to an individual’s personality
is the extent to which a person’s outlook represents a mature approach to external events.
Emotional maturity has been defined as, “the capacity to control impulses, the adoption
of a broad and unselfish perspective, and acceptance of responsibility for the
consequences of one’s actions” (Mayseless & Scharf, 2003, p.6). Previous research
found a negative linear relationship between age and emotionality (e.g., Lawton, Kleban,
& Dean, 1993; Neugarten & Neugarten, 1996; Schieman, 1999). Thus, age is positively
related to maturity. In addition, maturity is positively related to a tendency to search for
more information and to take the time to evaluate it adequately. Therefore, older middle
managers were expected to experience lower levels of strategic role conflict than younger
middle managers by averting unnecessary disparities in the conclusions they drew from
the information they gathered that would be more in agreement with the conclusions that
the top managers to whom they reported draw. However, although the sign was in the
hypothesized direction this hypothesis was not supported. One reason for this lack of
support could be that age might have an effect on strategic role conflict through
environmental perceptions. It may be that older middle managers tend to interpret the
environment as more stable, which may coincide with their top manager’s interpretations
because top managers tend to view environments as more stable. Thus, the effect of age
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on strategic role conflict may be occurring through environmental perceptions. However,
such mediating effect was not hypothesized and was not tested.
In hypotheses 1b, I suggested that the difference in chronological ages of the
middle manager and the top manager to whom the line of command reports would be
positively related to strategic role conflict. The rationale for this hypothesis was that
differences in the amount of life experience and on the content of those life experiences
can lead to different conclusions regarding external stimuli and to different strategic role
expectations and behaviors. Extant research showed that high demographic diversity on
the variables of age and organizational tenure results in more difficulty in communication
that leads to conflict and power struggles (McCain, O'Reilly, & Pfeffer, 1983; Pfeffer,
1983; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Thus, I expected that as the difference in age between
the middle manager and the top manager increased, the level of strategic role conflict
would go up. Yet, although the sign was in the hypothesized direction this hypothesis
was not supported. One reason for the lack of support that age differential had an effect
on strategic role conflict could be that middle managers who had the largest age
difference with their top manager also had the largest differences in environmental
perceptions. The correlations between age differential and differences in environmental
perceptions were 0.264 for product markets and 0.212 for factor markets and both were
highly significant. This study found that differences in environmental perceptions had a
significant effect on strategic role conflict. Age difference could be exerting an effect on
strategic role conflict through the mechanism of different environmental perceptions.
This potential mediating effect was not hypothesized and consequently not explored.
Another reason could be that the difference in chronological ages does not act alone in
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creating higher levels of strategic role conflict in middle managers but interacts with the
difference in years of education. This interaction was not hypothesized, but a post hoc
analysis found evidence of this interaction (γ = 0.008, p = 0.039). It is possible that as
the middle manager and his/her top manager diverge more in age and in years of formal
education, they have increasingly more difficulty finding common ground and seeing a
common strategic vision. This post hoc finding should be further explored in future
research with new data to ascertain that it is not a product of chance.
In hypothesis 1c, I suggested that the middle manager’s years of formal education
would be associated with lower levels of strategic role conflict. I offered this hypothesis
based on theory and empirical evidence showing that years of formal education provide
individuals with valuable skills to cope with increased information processing demands,
with ability to discriminate among many of stimuli, and with open-mindedness and
flexibility that lead to less role conflict (Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). A
person’s level of education reflects the individual’s cognitive ability and skills because an
individual’s cognitive base evolves from experiences, and demographic characteristics of
individuals are indicators of the quality of their cognitive base (Cyert & March, 1963;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). When confronted with a situation that does not fit his or her
conceptual framework, a person with a flexible coping style is more likely to
accommodate another role sender’s expectations and reduce role conflict (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Kahn et al., 1964). Although the parameter estimate was in the
hypothesized direction, the hypothesis was not supported. There is at least one possible
explanation for this. Although years of formal education do provide individuals with
skills to cope with increased information processing demands, flexibility, and open-
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mindedness, they also provide individuals with inquisitive minds, receptivity to
innovation, and a repertoire of knowledge to support more assertive positions (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984). It has also been shown that educated individuals are more likely to
engage in boundary spanning, which has been linked to higher role conflict previously
(Dollinger, 1984) and also found in the present study. It is possible that in spite of the
flexibility conferred by higher levels of education, as middle managers’ knowledge
increases, they also span more boundaries and question, and perhaps even challenge, their
top manager’s positions, albeit in the privacy of their own thoughts, leading to more
rather than less strategic role conflict.
In hypothesis 1d, I suggested that the difference in years of formal education
between the middle manager and the top manager to whom their line of command reports
would be associated with higher levels of strategic role conflict. I based this hypothesis
on a similar diversity argument as the one I used in the age-related diversity hypothesis.
Extant research had showed that demographic diversity in teams leads to conflict and
power struggles because at high levels of diversity communication becomes increasingly
strained and riddled with conflict as a result of the disparity in individual’s views
(McCain, O'Reilly, & Pfeffer, 1983; Pfeffer, 1983; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
Therefore, I argued that two individuals who are vastly different in terms of years of
formal education can arrive at significantly different conclusions regarding external
stimuli, develop different propensities to respond, disagree in their approaches, and arrive
at different expectations for each other’s behaviors because of their different cognitive
bases. I further argued that since years of formal education is related to an individual’s
type of conclusions regarding stimuli and to the type of response to those stimuli, and

97

since differences in conclusions and approaches are linked to poor communication and
different expectations, the difference in years of formal education between the middle
manager and the top manager to whom the middle manager reports could be a predictor
of their likely agreement or disagreement as to what external events mean for the
organization’s strategy and could lead to higher levels of strategic role conflict in the
event of disagreements. Although the parameter estimate was in the hypothesized
direction and in spite of the sound theoretical basis for this prediction, the data did not
support this hypothesis. A possible reason for this result could be that the difference in
years of education does not act alone in creating higher levels of strategic role conflict in
middle managers but interacts with the difference in chronological ages. This interaction
was not hypothesized, but a post hoc analysis found evidence of it (γ = 0.008, p = 0.039).
It is possible that as the middle manager and his/her top manager diverge more in age and
years of formal education, they have increasingly more difficulty finding common ground
and seeing a common strategic vision. This post hoc finding should be further explored
in future research with new data to ascertain that it is not a product of chance.
6.1.3 Discussion of results about the relationship between the nature of the middle
manager’s position within the organization and strategic role conflict
In hypothesis 2a, I suggested that middle managers in positions with more
boundary-spanning activity would experience more strategic role conflict than middle
managers in positions with less boundary-spanning activity. The rationale for this
hypothesis was that managers in positions that are required to span the boundaries of their
departments or the organization interact with different groups and different role senders.
Role senders that belong to different groups are likely to have different values and pursue
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different interests. Being likely that the groups outside the organization with whom the
middle manager interacts are not the same as the outside groups with whom the top
manager interacts, I hypothesized that boundary-spanning middle managers would have
increasingly different ideas than their top manages regarding what strategic behaviors
would be more appropriate and lead to higher strategic role conflict. This hypothesis was
fully supported.
As stated, there was considerable theoretical basis to expect this result. As
boundary-spanning middle managers interact with outside groups and outside role
senders, they are likely to be exposed to conflicting expectations regarding roles, strategic
behaviors, what values to espouse, and what interests to represent. Middle managers
exposed to different points of view encounter difficulty deciding what strategic behaviors
to enact and hence experience more stress (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1958; Friedman
& Podolny, 1992; Kahn et al., 1964; Whetten, 1978). In addition to the difficulty of
satisfying different groups, the lack of trust in the boundary-spanning middle manager
that the different groups might develop as the different parties worry that the boundaryspanning manager is being influenced by other groups is also a source of stress (Adams,
1976; Miles, 1976; Organ, 1971; Organ & Greene, 1972; Van Sell, Brief, and Schuler,
1981).
In hypothesis 2b and 2c, I suggested that middle managers higher in the
organizational hierarchy would experience greater amounts of strategic role conflict than
middle managers lower in the organizational hierarchy (hypothesis 2b) and that middle
managers that communicated more frequently with their top manager would experience
greater amounts of strategic role conflict (hypothesis 2c). I based these predictions on the
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rationale that most middle managers’ strategic role conflict derives from vertical
interactions with top managers. A middle manager’s position in the organization and
frequency of communication with his/her top manager can contribute to the amount of
strategic role conflict experienced by the middle manager for several reasons. First, the
closer the middle managers are to their top manager, the greater the observability of their
behavior (Kahn et al., 1964). As a result, top managers would be able to increase their
pressure on the middle manager as they are able to observe deviations in the middle
manager’s behavior from what the top manager expected (Kahn et al., 1964). Another
reason for the increased pressure on middle managers who are closer to their top
managers is the functional dependence of the top manager’s job on the performance of
the middle manager. The closer a middle manager is to his/her top manager, the more
the performance of the top manager depends on the performance of the middle manager
and the more pressure the top manager would want to exert (Kahn et al., 1964). Finally,
top managers have more opportunity to exert pressure on middle managers closer to
them, and they exert this pressure via communication. Thus, proximity and frequency of
communication would enable the top manager to exert the increased pressure and
increase the middle manager’s strategic role conflict. Hypothesis 2c (frequency of
communication) was fully supported. As theory suggested, top managers were able to
put more pressure on the middle managers with whom they most frequently
communicated. On the other hand, hypothesis 2b (layers of management) was only
marginally supported. A possible reason why hypothesis 2b was only marginally
supported might be that middle managers need not only to be close to their top manager
in the organizational chart but also need to have frequent communication with their top
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manager in order to be increasingly pressured. Thus, we would have to look at the
interaction between layers of management and frequency of communication to see if
there is a significant difference between managers at the same organizational level but
who differ in the frequency of communication with their top manager.
6.1.4 Discussion of results about the relationship between differences in
environmental perceptions and strategic role conflict
In hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, I predicted that the greater the difference in
environmental perceptions of the product and factor markets between the middle manager
and the top manager to whom the middle manager reported, the greater the amount of
strategic role conflict that the middle manager would experience. The basis for this
prediction was that under conditions of high complexity and rapid environmental change,
different layers of management would likely attach different meanings for the
organization to the environmental changes that they observe (Bourgeois, 1980; Floyd &
Lane, 2000; Lorenzi, Sims, & Slocum, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tosi, Aldag, &
Storey, 1973). The reasoning was that middle managers would interpret unexpected
customers’ demands or rapidly changing technology reported by operating managers as
cues for radical strategic change. Conversely, top managers who usually do not have
day-to-day contact with customers would tend to be more committed to the status quo
rather than to support radical strategic change because their environmental perceptions
are influenced by frequent interactions with representatives of the capital markets who
tend to have a more conservative view of the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Floyd & Lane, 2000). Thus, differences in environmental perceptions between the
middle manager and the top manager would lead to greater strategic role conflict that the
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middle manager would experience These hypotheses were fully supported. As predicted,
the different environmental perceptions led to divergent interpretations of what the
environmental changes imply for the organization, what strategic renewal sub-process
was appropriate to enact, and increased strategic role conflict in the middle management
ranks (Biddle, 1979; Floyd & Lane, 2000).
6.1.5 Discussion of results about the relationship between the quality of the
relationship middle manager / top manager and strategic role conflict
Hypothesis 4.1 suggested that the greater the trust between middle and top
manager, the lower the strategic role conflict that the middle manager would experience.
The basis for this prediction was that mutual trust, respect, and friendship are
characteristics of a close, direct relationship between individuals that help minimize
dissimilarities in expectations because they promote understanding through effective
knowledge transfer (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Kale et al. 2000). Informal interpersonal bonds
that involve trust, respect, and liking are associated with a lower degree of role conflict in
part because they help improve the quality and effectiveness of communication and
predispose the parties to resolve conflicting expectations through dialogue and exchange
of information (Kahn et al., 1964). Thus, the expectation that the higher the trust, the
lower the strategic role conflict. This hypothesis was supported (p≤0.052). These results
suggest that when a middle manager and a top manager have mutual trust for each other,
the middle manager is better equipped to manage differences in mutual expectations and
resolve them in ways that do not result in increased strategic role conflict for the middle
manager. The angle that was explored in hypothesis 4.2 was the notion that if one of the
parties in the relationship had more trust in the other party than the other party had in the
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former, the discrepancy would result in higher strategic role conflict. However, the data
failed to support this hypothesis.
Building on hypothesis 4.1, in hypothesis 4.3 I suggested that as mutual affect in
the relationship between the middle manager and the top manager to whom he or she
reported increased, the amount of strategic role conflict experienced by the middle
manager would decrease. However, even though the theoretical rationale is solid and
similar to the one offered for hypothesis 4.1, hypothesis 4.3 was not supported. This lack
of support suggests that in the professional setting of the organization, the amount of the
mutual affective dimension is not as important to manage differences in strategic role
expectations as is the ability to trust that the other party is acting in good faith. Following
a similar argument as in hypothesis 4.2, hypothesis 4.4 proposed that that if one of the
parties in the relationship had more affect for the other party than the other party had on
the former, this discrepancy would result in higher strategic role conflict. This
hypothesis was fully supported (p<0.05). This finding in conjunction with the finding in
hypothesis 4.3 suggest that the affect dimension is relevant to strategic role conflict only
when the relationship between the middle manager and the top manager is unbalanced;
that is, when the affect that one party feels for the other is not reciprocated equally.
In hypotheses 4.5, I predicted that the more the relationship between the middle
manager and the top manager showed cognitive flexibility, the less strategic role conflict
the middle manager would experience. The basis for this prediction was that when the
information exchange process between two people is characterized by reflection,
objective information review, use of different perspectives, openness to listening to the
other party, having the capacity and willingness to change one’s opinion, and developing
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a large variety of interpretations (i.e., characterized by high cognitive flexibility),
interpersonal aggression is diminished (Chesebro & Martin, 2003). Thus, it was
hypothesized that cognitive flexibility, as a characteristic of positive, effective, highquality interpersonal relationships, would be inversely related to the middle manager’s
strategic role conflict. Surprisingly, this hypothesis was not supported by the data. The
lack of support might be that high cognitive flexibility between the middle manager and
the top manager has an effect on strategic role conflict only under special conditions,
high trust, for example. However, possible interaction effects of cognitive flexibility
with other exogenous variables were not hypothesized and not tested. Hypothesis 4.6
explored the notion that if one of the parties in the relationship had more cognitive
flexibility than the other party, this discrepancy would result in higher strategic role
conflict. This hypothesis was not supported.
Following a similar argument as the one offered for hypothesis 4.5, hypothesis 4.7
suggested that as integrative bargaining in the relationship between the middle manager
and the top manager to whom he or she reported increased, the amount of strategic role
conflict experienced by the middle manager would decrease. The basis for this
hypothesis was that as two parties engage in interaction, the extent to which bargainers
perceive a situation as integrative (win-win) depends on the interaction between them
being based on reciprocity (Putnam & Jones, 1982). If two people try to find common or
complementary interests that benefit both parties rather than just one during their mutual
influencing process (Raes, et al., 2011) the win-win orientation to problem solving
enhances cooperation and decreases conflict. However, even though the theoretical
rationale is solid and similar to the one offered for hypothesis 4.5, hypothesis 4.7 was
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also not supported. As was the case with hypothesis 4.5, this lack of support could be the
result of possible interaction effects of integrative bargaining with other exogenous
variables that were not hypothesized and not tested. Lastly, hypothesis 4.8 argued that if
one of the parties in the relationship had more integrative bargaining than the other party,
this discrepancy would result in higher strategic role conflict, but this hypothesis was not
supported either.
6.2 Conclusion
This dissertation contributes to the stream of research of strategy process by
extending our understanding of the new construct “strategic role conflict” offered by
Floyd and Lane (2000). The findings in this dissertation support the notion that middle
managers experience strategic role conflict and that there are certain antecedents that
precede it. This is an important finding because it has been demonstrated that middle
managers can be critical to a firm’s strategic renewal and that barriers to their strategic
involvement can negatively affect firm performance. In conducting this research, I
examined this important but understudied area of strategic management in the context of
a large domestic firm undergoing significant but not drastic environmental change
because in organizations in this type of environment, it may not be clear whether middle
managers should be trying to renew the organization’s capabilities to adapt to the
changing conditions or whether they should hone their current competencies to better
implement their current strategy. The results indicate that the key predictors of middle
managers’ strategic role conflict are the amount of boundary spanning that middle
managers engage in as part of their jobs, the degree of disparity in their perception of the
products and factors markets vis-à-vis top management, the frequency of their direct
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communication with their top manager, the amount of mutual trust between the top
manager and the middle manager, and the amount of disparity in the feelings of mutual
affect between the top manager and the middle manager.
According to the results, the degree of boundary spanning activities of middle
managers sets the stage for middle managers’ differential exposure to diverging
perspectives. The disparity of middle managers’ perceptions of the products and factors
markets vis-à-vis top management’s defines the areas of disagreement about what
middle-management’s strategic roles top management expects to see enacted. The
frequency of direct communication with top management provides the battleground for
strategic role conflict to emerge. Finally, the degree of mutual trust between the top
manager and the middle manager and the amount of disparity in the feelings of mutual
affect between the top manager and the middle manager allow for strategic role conflict
to be experienced by the middle manager.
The support found for the hypotheses mentioned above lead the researcher to
speculate that the key factors involved in strategic role conflict can be reduced to the
amount of complexity involved in the middle manager’s job and to the relationships that
the middle manager has at high managerial levels. A possible theoretical model to
describe this conjecture would look like this:
Figure 6.1
Alternative Model of Strategic Role Conflict
Managerial
Relationships of the
Middle Manager

Complexity of the
Middle Manager’s
job

Strategic Role
Conflict
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This model implies some interesting research questions. For example, how is job
complexity related to strategic role conflict? And are aspects of job complexity more
prominent in explaining strategic role conflict? Also interesting would be to ask how
managerial relationships impact strategic role conflict and whether there are dimensions
of the relationship that are more important in explaining strategic role conflict. Finally, it
would be of interest to understand if job complexity and managerial relationships interact
to explain strategic role conflict.
As the empirical results lend support to these conjectures, this study has
significant implications for practice and research. In the following sections, I discuss
these implications. Then, I turn my attention to the limitations of this study and conclude
by examining areas of future research.
6.2.1 Implications for practice
This dissertation has several important implications for managers. It articulates
that practitioners can predict what factors contribute to strategic role conflict and suggests
that strategic role conflict can be managed in a constructive way. This is important
because many organizational outcomes such as strategic renewal depend on middle
managers’ being able to enact appropriate strategic roles and top management’s
supporting the actions of middle managers as they enact strategic roles appropriate for the
environment. Consequently, the focus of this study on the antecedents of strategic role
conflict should be of particular interest. The first takeaway from a practice perspective is
the importance for top managers to develop a more attentive, two-way dialogue with
boundary-spanning middle managers to avail themselves of divergent perspectives. By
being open to consider the middle manager’s perspective, top managers can go a long
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way to help reduce differences in environmental perspective and what they mean for the
organization, help reduce strategic role conflict in the middle-management ranks, and
help the organization have a more successful strategic renewal process. In addition, this
study also suggests that by developing relationships with middle managers characterized
by high mutual trust and balanced mutual affect top managers can help middle managers
experience lower levels of strategic role conflict. Finally, given the proposed alternative
model of strategic role conflict, practicing managers can pay attention to the complexity
of the middle manager’s job and to the managerial relationships of the middle manager to
try to reduce strategic role conflict.
6.2.2 Implications for research
This dissertation contributes to theory by extending role theory and relational
exchange theory into strategic process research. Our better understanding of the role of
strategic role conflict in organizations has several implications for strategic management
research. Extant literature on strategic renewal suggests that middle managers’
involvement in strategy is important for firms and that middle management’s
involvement in strategy can result in performance benefits to firms. This dissertation
explains, in limited fashion, some of the antecedents of strategic role conflict that
interfere with middle manager’s effective performance of their strategic roles that can
result in negative consequences for the organization. It demonstrates empirically that
strategic role conflict is a useful and distinct construct that can be related to certain,
measureable antecedents. The concept of strategic role conflict is important because it
has the potential to help explain why some organizations adapt better than others. It can
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also help explain differences in individual middle manager’s contributions to the strategic
process.
This study tested two possible models to explain strategic role conflict. Strategic
role conflict is a complex phenomenon, and the findings suggest that it is necessary to
look for more fine-grained explanation. The model that offered more and more nuanced
explanatory variables was able to provide a reasonable fit to the data and explain a
satisfactory amount of the variance in strategic role conflict.
Using the context of a large, complex firm that was undergoing substantial
environmental change, this study examined strategic role conflict empirically for the first
time in the literature. This approach was appropriate and enabled the possibility of
testing the emerging theories of strategic role conflict because it used a homogeneous
sample from a single population providing a rigorous test of the theoretical constructs and
relationships and avoiding spurious differences that arise when sample subjects have
unique circumstances (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981). In doing so, this study
effectively combined role theory, social / relational exchange theory, and the middle
management perspective making contributions to all three and extended strategic
management research by elucidating the link between strategic role conflict and some of
its antecedents.
This dissertation highlighted the importance of differences in environmental
perceptions, boundary spanning, frequency of communication, trust, and affect in the
emergence of strategic role conflict. While considerable theoretical research has been
done in the area of middle management involvement in strategy, this study helps build on
that literature by helping us better understand strategic role conflict.

109

Finally, future research might explore the alternative model of strategic role
conflict that was proposed above. Researchers could test hypotheses of how the
complexity of the middle manager’s job and to the managerial relationships of the middle
manager relate to strategic role conflict. Hopefully, this study will spur further research
into this important stream of research.
6.3 Limitations and areas for future research
This study has several potential limitations. Generalizability is the most notable
limitation of this study given that the findings are based on a one-company sample.
However, by design, this study was not meant to offer generalizability across all firms.
Instead, this study was designed to search for evidence that certain theoretical linkages
between the exogenous and the endogenous variables existed and to test if the theorized
construct of strategic role conflict could be measured and linked to some theoretical
antecedents such as characteristics of the middle manager’s position within the
organization, difference in environmental perceptions, and quality of the relationship
between the middle manager and the top manager. Understanding the dynamics of
strategic role conflict as an important organizational phenomenon was the main goal of
this dissertation.
Another potential limitation is that both dependent measures and independent
measure were collected on the same survey instrument. Again, because many of the
independent measures were composites of the middle managers’ and the top manager’s
responses and because of the many techniques used in the design of the survey
instrument, the chance for common method bias was minimized. Nevertheless, even
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though I used Harman’s single-factor test to test post hoc that common method bias was
not a problem, there is always the possibility that it is a limitation.
One important limitation of this study is that as a result of practical limitations
during data collection, the range of variance of the discrepancy variables that imply a
relationships between top managers and middle managers (i.e., trust discrepancy, affect
discrepancy, cognitive flexibility discrepancy, and integrative bargaining discrepancy)
have constrained ranges of variation. This is the result of having only one set of
responses for these discrepancy variables from each of the two top managers included in
the study. Another important limitation is that the statistical power of this study is
somewhat weak having only a sample size of 249 cases to estimate a large number of
parameters in the structural model. Given these two limitations (i.e., constrained variance
and rather weak statistical power), the likelihood of getting any results was very low. It
is somewhat impressive that in spite of these two limitations, the study was able to find
support for the structural model and for six of the seventeen hypotheses that were tested.
Lastly, another important limitation of this study is the cross-sectional nature of
the survey and the analysis. While this project has yielded important insights into how
strategic role conflict relates to its antecedents, nevertheless it is a still a one-shot fixed in
time picture that gives no true sense of the direction of causation or if there is any reason
to suspect causation between the independent variables and the dependent variable.
Future research should consider studying strategic role conflict using longitudinal studies
or experimental studies which could also make manipulations of the exogenous variables.
At the individual level, future research should take a closer look at the effect of
strategic role conflict on the effectiveness of the middle manager’s strategic involvement.
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At the firm level, future research should examine if differences in aggregate middle
managers strategic role conflict can explain differences in firm performance. Another
important area for future research could examine strategic role conflict in the context of
many firms. A study involving many firms would give the opportunity to test for
interaction effects between measures of the objective environment and the exogenous
variables used in this study. In addition, it would provide the ability to generalize to
other firms. Finally, another area of future research in the context of many firms could
examine the effect of different types of organizational controls on the management or
prevention of strategic role conflict.
This dissertation sought a better understanding of the new construct of strategic
role conflict. The middle management perspective was used to understand how strategic
role conflict relates to certain antecedents, providing evidence that the strategic renewal
efforts of middle managers can potentially be impacted by the existence of strategic role
conflict and interfere with important, long-term organizational goals such as strategic
adaptation.
This research project has made some significant contributions to the field of
strategic management by providing an empirical test of how the characteristics of the
middle manager’s position within the organization, the difference in environmental
perceptions between the middle manager and the top manager, and the quality of the
relationship between the middle manager and the top manager relate to the level of
strategic role conflict experienced by middle managers.
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APPENDIX A
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY

Dear _____________:
In today’s business world, it is hard to find an executive of an American company
who is not convinced of the importance of utilizing the potential of its middle
managers to implement strategy or to contribute to the development of strategic
initiatives. Yet many firms today are having a difficult time harnessing this
strategic potential in a manner that allows them to compete more effectively. In
this regard, the University of Massachusetts Amherst is conducting a study of
factors that influence the development of strategic role conflict. Strategic role
conflict interferes with a company’s efforts to effectively align their middle
managers’ strategic behaviors to the company’s external environment to develop
and sustain a competitive advantage.
We would greatly appreciate your company’s participation in this study. Ahead
you will find links to the surveys for your inspection. There are two versions of
the survey: one for top managers, the other one for middle managers. The survey
should take no more than 15-20 minutes for your managers to complete. In return
for your company’s participation, we will provide you with a summary of the
findings from the study as well as a customized profile of your company with
recommendations if appropriate. Under no circumstances will your responses be
made available to anyone other than the research team members listed below.
If your company wishes to participate, please contact me by e-mail at:
hflores@xxx.xxxxx.xxx. If you prefer to call, my mobile number is: (xxx) xxxxxxx. Thank you in advance for your interest in our study. We look forward to
your participation.
Sincerely,

Hector R. Flores
PhD Candidate
(Principal Co-Investigator)

William Wooldridge, PhD
Professor
(Principal Co-Investigator)
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APPENDIX B
INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Dear Respondent,
The Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts Amherst, is working
on a research project about strategic role conflict. We need your help in completing our
survey. Your responses will make a valuable contribution to the general knowledge base
in this area. Through your participation, we hope to understand what leads to the
strategic role conflict experienced by middle managers. The results of the survey will be
useful to devise ways to reduce strategic role conflict. We also hope to publish the
results in a scientific journal.
On the next page is a link to a short questionnaire that asks a variety of questions about
strategic role conflict. Participation in the study is voluntary. There will be no negative
consequences to you if you choose not to do the survey. If you choose to complete the
survey, it should take you about 15-20 minutes to do so. This survey is not a test of
ability, and there is no right or wrong answer to each of the questions or statements.
The survey is anonymous and all responses will be kept strictly confidential in this study.
The data or information collected from you will be aggregated for analysis only for this
project. No information that might tend to identify you will be shared with anyone
outside the research group or with any third parties.
We hope you will take the time to complete the questionnaire. Regardless of whether
you choose to participate, if you would like a summary of the findings, please contact us
at the address given below.
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire or about being
in this study, you may contact us at hflores@xxx.xxxxx.xxx. The Institutional Review
Board (IRB) at the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst has approved this study. If you have any concerns about your rights as a
participant in this study, you may contact Isenberg IRB Chair, Professor D. Anthony
Butterfield at dabutter@xxx.xxxxx.xxx.
If you have read this form and decided to participate in the project described above,
please click on the link in the following page to proceed to the questionnaire. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Hector R. Flores
PhD Candidate
(Principal Co-Investigator)

William Wooldridge, PhD
Professor
(Principal Co-Investigator)
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APPENDIX C
TABLES
Table A.1: Table of Constructs and Variables
Concept
Demographic
Characteristics
Middle
Manager’s
Position
within the
Organization
Dissimilarity
in
Environmental
Perceptions

Construct
Chronological Age
Total Years of
Formal Education
Boundary
Spanning
Managerial Layers
below Top
Management
Environmental
Perceptions –
Product Markets
Environmental
Perceptions –
Factor Markets
Trust
Trust Discrepancy
Affect

Affect Discrepancy
Cognitive
Flexibility
Relationship
Characteristics Cog. Flex. Discrep.
Integrative
Bargaining
Int. Barg. Discrep.

Internal
Subjective
Psychological
State

Indicator
Observed Variable
Survey Item
Observed Variable
Survey Item
Latent Variable
Survey Items
Observed Variable
Survey Item
Latent Variables
Survey Items adapted from
Joshi & Campbell (2003),
Jaworski & Kohli (1993),
and Dickinson & Weaver
(1997)
Latent Variable
Survey Items adapted from
Cook & Wall (1980)
Latent Variable
Survey Items adapted from
Tsui (1983)
Latent Variable
Survey Items adapted from
Martin & Rubin (1995)
Latent Variable
New Items derived from
Raes, Heijltjes, Glunk &
Roe’s (2011) definition

Variable
Name

Internal Reliability (*)

Age

N/A

YrsEdu

N/A

BoundSpa

Cronbach’s alpha = .72

Layers

N/A

ProdMkt

Cronbach’s alpha = .79

FactrMkt

Cronbach’s alpha = .71

Trust
TrustD
Affect
AffectD
CogFlex

Cronbach’s alpha = .85
Cronbach’s alpha = .90

Cronbach’s alpha = .90

CogFlexD
IntBarg
Cronbach’s alpha = .89
IntBargD

Frequency of
Communication
with Top Manager

Latent Variable
Commonly Used Items

FreqComm

Cronbach’s alpha = .96

Strategic Role
Conflict

Latent Variable
Survey Items adapted from
items originally developed
by Rizzo, House, and
Lirtzman (1970)

StrRConf

Cronbach’s alpha = .89

(*) From my SPSS internal reliability analysis.
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Table A.2: Survey Items
Variable
Name

Indicator
Name
IntDep
IntOp

BoundSpa
IntDiv
IntOut
Layers

Layers
PrefChg
CustDem

ProdMkt

PrefPre
DemFor
TechChg
BigOpps

FactrMkt

DiffFor

Survey Item
As part of your job, how frequently do you interact with persons
outside your department?
As part of your job, how frequently do you interact with persons
outside your operation?
As part of your job, how frequently do you interact with persons
outside your division?
As part of your job, how frequently do you interact with persons
outside your company?
To the best of your knowledge, how many layers of management
separate your position from the position of the CEO?
Customer preferences are constantly changing in / our industry.
Customer demand for our products varies dramatically.
In our kind of business, customers’ product / preferences are very
difficult to predict.
In our industry, customer demand is fairly easy to / forecast.
The technology in our industry is changing / rapidly.
Technological changes provide big opportunities / in our industry.
It is very difficult to forecast where the technology in our industry
will be in the next 2 to 3 years.

In the last five years, a large number of new product ideas have
NewIdeas been made possible through technological breakthroughs in our
industry.
Top management is sincere in their attempts to meet my point of
view.
Trust &
Trust1
I can trust top management to lend me a hand if I need it.
TrustD
Effectiv Top management seems to do an effective job.
I feel quite confident that top management will always try to treat
TreatMe
me fairly.
Helpful To what degree do you consider top management to be helpful?
Admire To what extent do you admire top management?
Affect &
AffectD
Respect To what extent do you respect top management's judgment?
Like
How well do you like top management?
Workable I can find workable solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.
Creative I am willing to work at creative solutions to problems.
CogFlex
&
I am willing to listen and consider alternatives for handling a
CogFlexD Consider problem.
TryDiff I am willing to try different ways of thinking.
Sincere
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Table 2 – SURVEY ITEMS (Continued)
Collabor
Finding

IntBarg &
IntBargD

Oriented

Coopera

WinWin

Z1
Z2

StrRConf

Z3

Z4
Z5
Z6
FreqComm
Age
YrsEdu

OftComm
OftTalk
OftEmail
Age
YrsEdu

My relationships and interactions with top management can
be characterized as a collaborative problem-solving process.
My relationships and interactions with top management can
be characterized as finding common or complementary
interests that benefit both parties rather than just one.
My relationships and interactions with top management can
be characterized as oriented toward achieving a win-win
situation.
My relationships and interactions with top management can
be characterized as cooperative and oriented to create value
for both parties.
My relationships and interactions with others within the
organization can be characterized as a process of mutual
influence seeking a better understanding of the external
environment and its implications for the organization.
I am expected to enact one set of strategic behaviors when I
should be enacting a different one (for example, helping to
create a new strategy vs. implementing the current strategy,
or vice versa).
I work under incompatible policies and / guidelines.
My boss and I disagree on what strategic behaviors I should
be enacting under current environmental conditions (for
example, helping to create a new strategy vs. implementing
the current strategy, or vice versa).
I receive incompatible strategic direction from two or more /
people.
I am not sure if my proposing new strategic initiatives is
what / my boss expects of me.
The company's present strategy is not what current
environmental conditions require.
How often do you communicate with top management?
How often do you talk with top management?
How often do you exchange email with top management?
What year were you born?
What are your total years of formal education counting from
the first grade?
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